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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the state of the Hungarian judiciary, in terms of judicial independence 
and authority, asking how this has developed since the transition to democracy in 1989-1990, 
and why. The focus is on both the ordinary judiciary and the Constitutional Court, which is a 
separate institution, led by its own administrations. Judicial independence is a scholarly field 
that has received renewed attention in Hungary after the victory of Fidesz in the general 
elections of 2010, which brought fundamental changes in Hungarian constitutionalism, and 
the conditions and functioning of the judiciary. Much of the attention has been given on 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court, which from its beginning in 1990 developed a rich and 
extensive jurisprudence, giving it an international reputation as a powerful and important 
court. However, the waves of post 2010 constitutional amendments and the new 2012 
constitution, negatively affected the Court, changing its selection process, composition, 
jurisdiction and procedures. The ordinary judiciary, which took longer time to establish its 
independence after the 1989 transition, has also recently undergone reforms, ostensibly 
aiming to make it more efficient and suitable for a democratic society. The changes to the 
judiciary have been criticized by the European Union, who claims that some of the changes 
contravene European standards.  
Through an exploratory case study, the thesis examines the processes, events and changes that 
have shaped the development of judicial independence in Hungary, and seeks to identify the 
underlying causal mechanisms that have led to the current situation. The study is based on key 
informant interviews conducted during fieldwork in Hungary, November 2013, supported by 
secondary sources.  
The main findings in this thesis are: firstly, that the sweeping victory of Fidesz in the general 
elections in 2010, and the subsequent constitutional changes, left the Constitutional Court 
weakened, with limited jurisdiction and a diminished role in the state organization. Secondly, 
that the new system of justice administration introduced to the ordinary judiciary in 2011, and 
in particular the broad powers of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary, which 
are unprecedented in European practice, threatens judicial independence in Hungary.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction: judicial independence in Hungary 
 
”The Constitutional Court has become something as unusual as a guardian in 
desperate need of rescuing. As a dissenting opinion formulated it: The Court has put 
down their gun – and surrendered” 
 (Tóth, B 2013 [interview]) 
 
Why is the Hungarian Constitutional Court – which in the 1990s was hailed as the strongest 
and most independent Court in the world (Polgari 2013 [interview]) – in such a precarious 
state? This thesis aims to trace the trajectory of judicial independence in Hungary in the post -
1989 era, and contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics at play.  
 
In this study I will argue that the judicial development should be seen on the basis of the 
important event that took place in April 2010, when Viktor Orbán and his political party 
Fidesz won an overwhelming victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections. With 68 
percent of the seats in parliament and a two-thirds supermajority, Fidesz was able to change 
the constitution with respect to crucial features of institutional design relating to the structure 
of government and fundamental rights. The first year of office included no less than twelve 
amendments to the constitution. Many of these changes were designed with a sole purpose to 
weaken institutions that should, and could, check what the government was going to do next 
(Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 242). The first amendment removed the last restraint on a government 
with a two-thirds majority: an amendment that required a four-fifths vote of parliament to 
approve the rules for writing a new constitution. The heightened supermajority rule was 
designed in order to ensure that a future constitution would enjoy broad political consensus. 
Fidesz did not have the necessary four-fifths of the parliament, but since the four-fifths rule 
itself was not subject to special requirements, it could be changed by the normal amendment 
process. Since this only requires a two-thirds majority, the government was able to eliminate 
the four-fifths rule from the constitution – and was free to write a new constitution on its own 
(Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 139). Which they did.  
 
The Basic Law of 2012
1
 went into effect on January 1, 2012 with a great deal of public 
fanfare, and marked the final end of the Hungarian transition which begun in 1989 by 
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 Also referred to as the Fundamental Law of 2012 
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completely replacing the constitution established at that time. Parliament never adopted a new 
constitution at the beginning of the democratic era. Instead, most of the provisions in the 
communist constitution of 1949 were amended, and thus, only in its formal framework did the 
constitution of 1989 remain the same as the one from 1949. The understanding was that those 
amendments would be followed by a final constitution, as promised in the preamble of the 
1989 document. Though, the new constitution of 2012 did not become the final entrenchment 
of the democratic state of Hungary as promised. Instead it has caused waves of criticism from 
both inside and outside of Hungary, and a rapid acceleration of European attention regarding 
consequences of the new constitution, as well as its amendments, is a signal that Hungary has 
hit a European nerve (Scheppele, 2012). Most of the criticisms concern the structure of 
government that the new constitution is creating, and the assessments are harsh. While the 
1989 Constitution ensured a constitutional framework with checks on power, multiparty 
participation and a substantial role for minority parties, the Basic Law of 2012 is criticized as 
the constitution that dismantled this delicate system and turned Hungary into a constitutional 
democracy only in its name (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 238).  
 
While the Constitutional Court played a prominent role in the two first decades after the 
transition as the primary check on government and the guardian of the constitution, the 
ordinary judiciary took longer time to establish itself as an independent institution under the 
new Constitution.  Today, as I will demonstrate later in this thesis, the Constitutional Court 
has apparently lost power, and its activity is limited to a minimum, while a radical reform of 
the ordinary judiciary has caused international attention and allegations of impaired judicial 
independence.  
 
My research was born out of a puzzle: what can explain the apparent decline of the Hungarian 
judiciary and the country’s celebrated Constitutional Court? How are the changes related to 
the political developments in the country? My focus will be on both the ordinary judiciary and 
the Constitutional Court. The two institutions are completely separated, and led by separated 
administrative units. Thus, my research question is as follows:  
 
What is the state of the judiciary in Hungary in terms of judicial independence and authority, 
focusing both on the ordinary judiciary and the Constitutional Court, and how and why has 
this developed since the breakdown of communism in the 1980s? 
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The aim of this thesis is to assess the current state of the Hungarian judiciary, and to 
investigate the development of judicial independence in Hungary since the transition from 
communist rule in 1989. The research question is examined through an analysis of the 
development of the Hungarian judiciary since the breakdown of communism in 1989. I will 
further seek to understand the causes for this development as well as the implications for 
democracy. The thesis is a qualitative study, based on interview data collected during 
fieldwork in Budapest in November 2013. 
 
The following section provides a brief introduction of the Hungarian case. 
1.1 Setting the Scene: the Case of Hungary  
The fundamental idea of a constitutional democracy is a belief that citizens can exercise their 
participatory right to choose who is going to rule on their behalf, for a certain period of time. 
However, for this to function effectively, there need to exist an institution that can secure the 
rules of the game - including the electoral system itself. Hence, an independent judicial 
institution, which is professionalized and endowed with clear responsibilities, is central to the 
functioning of a modern democracy, and the development of an independent court that can 
function as a horizontal accountability channel is an important step in a democratization 
process (O'Donnell in Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999: 29-30).  
 
The case of Hungary is interesting: the Hungarian Constitutional Court had a strong and 
important position in the beginning of the 1990s, ushering in the transition to democracy 
while overseeing the creation of a new constitutional architecture. The Court managed to stay 
strong and powerful for more than two decades – a factor that contributed to it being famous 
all over the world (Uitz, 2013: 2). At one point it was even characterized as “the most active 
court in the world” (Dupré, 2003: 6). This is not the case any longer. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has apparently lost power, and although the Court still exists, it has 
largely disappeared from the political landscape. While some explain the development as a 
natural development in which democratic standards have reached the appropriate level and 
therefore left the Hungarian Constitutional Court with a diminished role in the political and 
judicial sphere of the Hungarian society, other see it as a direct result of extensive measures 
aimed at an institution that was created to check and balance the government. Critical voices 
claim that the Court has been a prominent victim of Hungarian constitution-making (Uitz, 
2013: 1-3). What is beyond question is that the Court’s development has occurred in parallel 
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with political actions and events, for instance the establishment of the Basic Law of 2012, 
which has caused the international society to ask questions concerning the quality and 
viability of the Hungarian democracy. 
The ordinary judiciary has gone through similar developments, and reforms in both 1997 and 
2011 sparked waves of criticism regarding the independence and authority of the judiciary 
(National Office for the Judiciary, 2014). A reform in 2011 concentrated all powers in the 
hands of the president of the newly established National Judicial Office, and introduced a 
system that Europe had never seen before. The powers of the president of the NOJ are 
unprecedented in European practice for their expansive scope, as well as for the inability of 
the affected actors to question the president’s actions. These changes contradicts European 
standards, and questioned the judicial independence of judges (Scheppele, 2012). The fierce 
criticism was further reinforced by new legislation forcing the retirement of 274 judges and 
public prosecutors from the ordinary judiciary, caused by an immediate reduction in the 
mandatory retirement age for these professions from 70 to 62. The European Commission 
closed infringement procedure on the forced retirement, and there were calls by the 
Commission for Hungary to comply with the judgments as soon as possible. Hungary 
therefore took the necessary measures and changes to bring the legislation in line with EU 
law. A new law lowered the retirement age to 65 over a period of 10 years, rather than 
lowering it to 62 years over one year, as the former law suggested (The Europen Commission, 
2013). But most of the judges and prosecutors who were forced to retire before the 
infringement procedure chose not to return to their previous occupations. The forced 
retirement of judges and prosecutors was heavily criticized by both internal and external 
voices, who saw this as another attempt by the government to curb the judiciary. 
1.1.1 The Democratic Transition 
The Hungarian transition out of communism began decades before 1989, and resulted in one 
of the most politically stable and economically prosperous democracies in the post-communist 
world. Among other post-communist countries, Hungary soon came off as the very definition 
of a successful transition to democracy and social market economy, and throughout the 1990s,  
other eastern European countries would look to Hungary for inspiration when they went 
through similar transitions (Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 208-212).  
 
Between 1948 and 1989, Hungary was a strict one-party dictatorship. However, only 10 
percent of the population belonged to the communist party. The remaining 90 percent were 
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perceived as potential enemies of the regime. The regime provoked resistance and protests 
among students and intellectuals on several occasions, and in October 1956 an organized 
peaceful mass demonstration took place. The demonstration led to the outbreak of the 
revolution on 23 October, which is seen as the first anti-totalitarian revolution in history 
(Argentieri, 2008: 218). A reform-oriented communist leader, Imre Nagy, took over as prime 
minister, and the cabinet was reorganized on a coalition that included representatives from all 
political parties. Unfortunately, the democratic surge was short-lived. Soviet troops invaded 
Hungary on 4 November, and the fight escaladed with a bloody fight with younger people on 
the streets of Budapest. Thousands of people were killed, and the civil protests were massive. 
Nagy and his cabinet were removed, and later imprisoned and executed. The revolution in 
itself did not result in a regime shift, but the inauguration of János Kádár as Prime Minister of 
Hungary changed the form of communism. With him the basic attitude of the government 
shifted from the totalitarian dictator Rakósi’s “whoever is not a follower is our enemy” to 
Kádár’s “whoever is not against us is with us” – a substantial change of the very foundational 
principle (Kinander, 2011: 13-14).  
 
Kádár led the country away from a classic totalitarianism to a post-totalitarianism regime, in 
which political passivity was recommended. More relaxed and tolerant social and economic 
policies characterized everyday life and the shift of the basic principle involved considerable 
freedom of expression, much more than in other countries and regimes in the region. 
However, from the mid-1970s, Hungary had high foreign debt as a consequence of loans 
aimed at financing an acceptable living standard. The communist leadership was aging, and 
the regime could no longer cope with the external and internal challenges. The period between 
1985 and 1989 witnessed a long erosion and disintegration of the communist regime, and the 
foundations of the old regime were questioned (Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 206-208).  
The transition from communism to democracy in 1989 was both peaceful and coordinated, 
and was the final result of the trilateral Round Table Talks between the ruling communist 
party and opposition groups. The peaceful negotiations introduced revolutionary outcomes, as 
democratic institutions replaced what had previously been an authoritarian regime. It also 
marked a new era of Hungarian constitutionalism (Uitz 2013: 6-7). The Stalinist constitution 
of 1949 was changed by the outgoing Communist parliament, but compared to the rather 
speedy political transformation of the country; the text of the Hungarian constitution was 
changed and amended only gradually. The thought was that these amendments, created in 
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1989-1990, would be followed by a complete constitutional overhaul. Nevertheless, they still 
created the legal framework of the new democracy, with all the main institutions 
characteristic of constitutionalism: a representative government, a parliamentary system, an 
independent judiciary, an ombudsman who could guard the fundamental rights of the 
Hungarian people – and a Constitutional Court that could review the constitutionality of laws 
and interpret the temporarily or transitional constitution, while waiting for the final 
constitution that were promised in the preamble of 1989 document (Kovács and Tóth 2011: 
183-184).  
1.1.2 The Constitutional Court 
Constitutional courts are seen as arguably the most important institutions to maintain the 
constitutional balance of powers (Kovács and Tóth 2011: 185), and were therefore introduced 
all over post-communist Central and Eastern Europe as the main symbol of transition to 
democracy. The courts carried with them a promise – a mandate to usher transition to 
democracy and to administer and lead the necessary and profound constitutional 
transformation. Furthermore, these courts were entrusted with what had previously been an 
unseen task of constitutional review; a task that was not bestowed upon already existing 
institutions. The constitutional courts were given a responsibility in overseeing the 
establishment of a new constitutional architecture, in which the judiciary had to build their 
jurisprudence and reputation and other democratic and independent institutions had to be 
established, so that the contours of a new system of government could be refined further (Uitz 
2013: 1-2).  
One of the main themes of the Round Table Talks was the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary
2
 that was instituted in conjunction with the democratization processes 
(Guarnieri 2014: 2). The Court was a major premise for the development of constitutional 
institutions, and the purpose of the Court was to monitor political and judicial processes 
tainted by years of illegitimate practice. The Court was created and came into effect already 
before the first free elections, giving them the opportunity to supervise the election process 
(Kinander, 2011: 16). The Constitutional Court did not have an institutional antecedent in 
Hungary, and the court was therefore seen as a fresh start for the constitutional democracy. 
The court’s main task was to serve as a check on political branches and the ordinary judiciary, 
including the parliament, which was given the opportunity to pass constitutional amendments 
with a two-thirds majority (Uitz 2013: 7-8). Furthermore, the court was considered to be the 
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 Hereinafter the HCC or the Court  
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guardian of fundamental rights and an international guarantee of the separation of powers 
(Kovács and Tóth 2011: 185).  
The Constitutional Court of Hungary is separated from the ordinary judiciary and the judicial 
system, and has unique constitutional interpretative authority. Under the 1989 constitution, it 
was known for a very broad competence: the abstract constitutional review of legal rules, 
Actio Popularis, which established the right for anyone to bring an action without limitations. 
There were no deadlines, and the applicant was not required to show any impact or other 
legally protected interests. A great majority of the court’s proceedings in the two first decades 
of the court fell within this category (Kovács and Tóth 2011: 185-186). The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court became known for standing up against the other political branches, and 
the court had, from its early years of operation, an excellent international reputation due to its 
strong and active presence. It’s jurisprudence on transitional justice and capital punishment 
was known all over the world, and the court was, at one point, characterized as “the most 
active and powerful constitutional court in the world” (Kinander 2011: 2).  
1.1.3 The Ordinary Judiciary  
In conformity with the socialist state model, the judiciary and the executive were closely 
interwoven during communism. The political transition in 1989 therefore created the basis of 
rule of law in Hungary, and gave rise to a new and independent judiciary established through 
gradual reforms. The result was a judicial system that started to resemble the classical 
Western European judiciary, with new regulations and provisions that were more compatible 
with a democratic regime (Sajó, 1993: 293-295).  
When the transition to democracy began, the administration and control of courts were given 
to the Minister of Justice. As there was a need to remodel and reorganize the judicial system 
in order to make it a more effective and modern, compatible with European standards, an act 
was introduced in 1997. The Act of 1997 provided the establishment of an organizational 
transformation of the legal system: a completely new organization of the judiciary was 
developed, and the National Council of the Judiciary was formed. All rights regarding the 
administration of courts were transferred from the Minister of Justice to this Council, which 
acted as an independent institution from the government and the legislative branch. The 
establishment of the council brought an end to the control of the government, and was 
believed to increase the independence of the judiciary (The Curia of Hungary, 2014).  
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1.2 Contributions to Existing Literature 
The thesis has two goals. In terms of theory, the goal is to contribute to an understanding of 
the factors that make some courts act more independent than others, and possess stronger 
judicial authority. I will do so by systematizing existing research findings regarding the nature 
and functioning of judiciaries, and how they hold other branches and state officials to account 
when they overstep their powers and the legal mandate given to them, and build a coherent 
framework, applicable to empirical evaluation of real-world judicial institutions. The 
framework will be applied and “tested” in an empirical analysis of the Hungarian case.  
Empirically, the aim is to understand the judicial developments in Hungary. Guided by the 
theoretical framework, the Hungarian judicial institution will be analyzed in a comprehensive 
manner, with a particular focus on its development since the end of communism and the 
consequences of extensive reforms for the judiciary’s independence and authority 
mechanisms. Finally, by merging these contributions, the systemic characteristics of the 
Hungarian judiciary will be discussed in terms of criteria of independence and strong 
authority functions, in order to illuminate the development of the judiciary.  
I will argue that my thesis can contribute to expanding academic knowledge about judicial 
independence. The field of judicial independence in Hungary, with notable exceptions, such 
as Kovács and Tóth (2011), Uitz (2013) and Bánkuti et al. (2012b), is characterized by 
outdated analyses, mostly stemming from the years before the enactment of the Basic Law of 
2012. Furthermore, most of them focus mostly on either one of the institutions, and not both. 
There is a need for new research on the field in order to identify mechanisms that underlie the 
recent development of the Hungarian judiciary. In general, there are few theoretical and 
empirical contributions that emphasize the declining role of courts and judicial independence 
within the context of a democratic regime. I will try to contribute to a better understanding of 
this – and how the legal institution of a country is challenged when democracy is threatened 
by authoritarian tendencies. The goal is to improve the existing theory by attempting to 
provide a deeper understanding of what happens when a court is weakened, and the factors 
that contributes to this weakening.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis  
While having established the scene, and explained why my research question is worth the 
attention of a year’s work, I will in the next chapter explain how my study is done through a 
methodology chapter. Here, I argue that doing a qualitative case study of Hungary, based on 
interview data, provides the depth that is necessary to give a reliable answer to the research 
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question. Through collecting interviews with centrally placed political, bureaucratic, juridical 
and academic persons I have been able to gather information that can help to explain the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. Interviews are of course complemented by other sources of data, 
such as documents and secondary literature.  
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework for my study, drawing on literature on judicial 
independence, authority and accountability functions. The theoretical framework helps build a 
structure, based on existing academic knowledge that tells me where to look when gathering 
data, and what to look for.  
Chapter 4 presents an empirical analysis, built on the data gathered while doing fieldwork in 
Budapest. In short, the main findings are that both the Constitutional Court and the ordinary 
judiciary are seriously weakened, and that the judicial independence of both judges and the 
institutions as a whole is questioned.  While the latter still has an undisputed place in the state 
organization, the Constitutional Court’s role is diminished to a minimum. These 
developments have happened in parallel with abrupt political events, and the findings show 
that there are clear correlations between changes at the constitutional level, introduced by the 
governing majority since 2010, and the judiciary’s development. These findings are discussed 
and analyzed in light of the theoretical expectations that were highlighted in the theory 
chapter. I show how a set of structural and institutional factors, such as appointment 
procedures in favor of the governing majority and the lack of protection of judge’s tenure, 
work to give Fidesz a clear advantage, and thus weakens the judiciary. Changes in the 
nomination process, which originally were designed to protect and insure the independence of 
judiciary, contributes to an increased risk of appointing unqualified persons – selected 
primarily on the basis of political preferences. The trend is further accentuated by a culture in 
which judicial decisions seem to be a function of the political preferences of the judges. 
Moreover, I discuss how a powerful court can be perceived as threatening to other political 
institutions, and therefore cause changes at the constitutional level with an aim to undermine 
the court. This is what has happened in Hungary: the pendulum has swung from an 
independent and strong court, to a weaker legal institution, much more exposed to abuse from 
other institutions. Finally, I show how the Hungarian judiciary has gone through gradual 
institutional changes, eventually changing the institutional basis for judicial independence.  
The last chapter in this thesis concludes and summarizes the findings, and includes some 
concluding remarks about the limitations and representativeness of my findings.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Methodology: qualitative case study research using 
interview data 
The choice of research method has implications for the result of the study. It is therefore 
crucial that one is critical of, and argues well for, the choice of method and data collection. 
The thesis is a case study aiming to investigate “a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009: 18). I seek to investigate and uncover how the 
judiciary has developed in Hungary since the breakdown of communism in 1989, in terms of 
judicial independence and authority, focusing in particular on the weakening of the judicial 
institution and its independence. The study is furthermore exploratory since the main aim it so 
uncover new evidence that has not been studied before.   
A main reason for my choice of doing interviews as the method of data collection is that few 
have collected the information that I was looking for – hence I had to go collect it myself. The 
Hungarian judiciary has received considerable attention over the last decade, both by 
international and national scholars, but, as mentioned before, most of these focus on the years 
before the Basic Law was adopted in 2012, and seeks to explain the strength of the judicial 
institution, rather than its weakening.  
This chapter will begin with discussing the principles of qualitative case study research, and 
why this method is most suitable to answer the research question of this study.  I will then 
explain the rationales behind choosing Hungary as a case, which is followed by an argument 
that data triangulation with a main focus on qualitative elite interviews, complemented with 
other sources of documentary data, provides the study with multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon (Yin, 2009: 116-117) that strengthens the validity and reliability of my findings.  
2.1 Qualitative Case Study 
A qualitative research design is conducted when a problem or issue needs to be explored, and 
the aim of a qualitative study is to gather an in-depth and complex understanding of the 
phenomenon (Creswell, 2013: 43-44). The case study is among the array of qualitative 
choices, and is the research method used in this study. Gerring (2007: 19) defines a case as a 
phenomenon with clearly defined boundaries, either observed at a single point in time or over 
some period of time. He further defines a case study as “the intensive study of a single case 
where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a 
population)” (Gerring, 2007: 20). In my study, the judicial system, both including the 
Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary, is the case, and how judicial independence 
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has developed since the transition in 1989 is what is observed. Subordinate to that is the 
interaction between political development and judicial independence, which constitutes the 
variables of the study that the outcome is supposedly dependent on (Gerring, 2007: 20-21). 
A case study is usually focused on the within-case variation, and typically includes several 
observations. The observations can be constructed diachronically, by observing the case or 
subsets of within-case units over time, or synchronically, by focusing on observations of 
within-case variations at a single point in time (Gerring, 2007: 21). Thus, like other case 
studies, the focus for this study is on the within-case variation. Process tracing is a method of 
such within-case analysis that can be a tool for causal inference. When process tracing, 
diagnostic pieces of evidence within a case are examined in order to support or overturn 
alternative explanatory hypotheses. The goal for my case is to establish whether events or 
processes within the case are in alignment with those predicted by the alternative explanations 
(Bennet, 2010: 208). By using interviews, documents and other sources of data, I can 
examines whether the causal process that theory implies in the case of study is evident in the 
values of the intervening variables of the case (George and Bennet, 2005: 6).  
The case study is constructed diachronically, meaning that the variation in my dependent 
variable is measured over time. I am able to do this because of the data that are available, and 
because of information gathered through interviews. This allows me to compare judicial 
independence throughout time, within the case. The study aims to identify processes and 
mechanisms that over time causes changes in the dependent variable, and a detailed review of 
the empirical evidence is therefore a considerable part of the research in this thesis. Tilly 
(2001: 24) argues that such a way of examining the field of study differs from other because it 
focuses on describing prominent features of events, and with a relatively general scope 
attempt to identify mechanisms within them. Hence, the empirical and comparative focus of 
this thesis will be changes within the variables, and the reasons behind this change, more than 
just on the value of the variables themselves.  
According to King et al. (1994: 45), an often overlooked advantage of case studies is that the 
in-depth study of a phenomenon may lead to more focused and relevant descriptions, even 
when few things are previously known about the subject. This is further emphasized by 
Gerring (2007: 439-43), who states that case study research is an excellent way of doing 
exploratory research, as it grants  the researcher the advantage to generate and test a great 
number of hypotheses in a “rough-and-ready way”. Furthermore, Yin (2009: 9-10) argues that 
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“questions beginning with ‘why’ and ‘how’ are explanatory questions that are likely to lead us 
to the use of case studies”, as such  questions deal with operational links that should be traced 
over time. The focus is on contemporary events, and the investigator has little control over the 
events studied (Yin, 2009: 9-11). Because I seek to understand how the judicial independence 
has developed, and why these developments have happened, a case study is the preferred 
method for my study.  
2.2 Case Selection 
George and Bennet (2005: 31-32) argues that when selecting a case to be studied, the 
researcher choose a case that can provide a strong possible inference on a particular theory. 
When I chose Hungary as a case for this thesis, I considered it a part of a population of states 
in which judicial independence is weakened as a result of external measures. As I wanted to 
uncover as much as possible about the phenomenon, drawing a case from a random sampling 
was never an option, as that could cause the case chosen being both unrepresentative and 
providing me with too little leverage into the research question. Therefore, I decided  to 
choose a deviant case in which the level of judicial independence is supposedly lower than 
one would expect, given surrounding countries and the general level of democracy in the 
region (Gerring, 2007: 87-107). The deviant-case method is an exploratory form of analysis, 
and as soon as the exploration of the case has identified a variable that can help to explain the 
case, it is no longer deviant (by definition), or at the very least, it will be less deviant 
(Gerring, 2007: 105-107). The purpose of choosing Hungary is to probe for new explanations 
that can help to explain the development of judicial independence, and search for the 
variable(s) making the case deviant.  
2.3 Data Collection: Methodological Triangulation  
An important aspect, according to King et al. (1994: 26), is that all data and analyses should, 
as far as possible, be replicable, so that a new researcher are able to duplicate the data 
presented in a study, and trace the logic behind the conclusions. Replicability is important 
even if no one actually follows the reasoning process. This can further strengthen the 
reliability of the study conducted (Yin, 2009: 45). I will in this section provide a detailed 
overview of what sources where used to answer the research question, and what implications 
the use of those sources might have.  
A major strength of case studies is the opportunity to use different sources of evidence. The 
use of multiple sources of evidence has several advantages, but most importantly it increase 
the validity and reliability of the conclusion as it develops what Yin (2009: 115) refers to as 
13 
 
“converging lines of inquiry”, which means that several sources of evidence points in the 
same direction. The findings or conclusion in a study based on different sources of 
information is likely to be more convincing and accurate than a study based on one source. 
Data triangulation, which encourages the researcher to collect information from multiple 
sources that are all aimed at corroborating the same phenomenon (Yin, 2009: 116), can 
generate more information to bear on the hypotheses (King et al., 1994: 26).  
Yin (2009: 101) discusses six sources of evidence as the ones most commonly used when 
conducting a case study research: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. Of these six sources, I utilize both 
documentation and interviews directly, but qualitative interviews are the primary mode of the 
data collection in this thesis, and I will therefore discuss this source of evidence first.  
2.3.1 Qualitative Interviews 
According to DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006: 314), interviews are among the most 
popular strategies for gathering and collecting qualitative data, and in a case study research, 
interviews are essential sources of information (Yin, 2009: 106). Tansey (2007: 4-5) argues 
how elite interviewing, which is interviews with selected people because of who they are and 
what positions they occupy (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 673),  is highly relevant for the  
process tracing approaches to case study research. As the aim of this thesis is to analyze 
judicial development through process tracing, elite actors will thus often be critical and useful 
sources of information about the judicial processes that are of interest (Tansey, 2007: 5). Elite 
actors such as politicians, judicial staff and bureaucrats, academics and judges can therefore 
provide my thesis with crucial insights. The goal was that the interview respondents would 
give me valuable insights into the state of the judiciary in a way that shed light on why and 
how these institutions have developed, and give clues and interpretations of other important 
sources of evidence that I utilized.  
Semi structured interviews
3
 
Qualitative interviews have been categorized in a variety of ways, but what most scholars 
seem to differentiate between is unstructured and semi structured interviews, which both 
provide qualitative data. As I wanted a dialogue between the respondents and the interviewer, 
the data was gathered through semi structured interviews. Such interviews are often scheduled 
in advance, and take place at a designated time and location. The questions are usually 
                                                          
3
 Similar to what Yin (2009: 107) refers to as focused interviews  
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predetermined and open-ended, but other questions might emerge from  the dialogue between 
interviewer and the respondents and the questions’ order will usually change (DiCicco-Bloom 
and Crabtree, 2006: 315). As the approach of semi structured interviews allows a less fixed 
sequence, allowing the respondent to formulate their own answers, while gathering in-depth 
information about the field of study, I decided to conduct information through this variation of 
interview (Creswell, 2013: 163-164). The ability to compare interviews are somewhat 
weakened by this way of interviewing, but that is not necessarily the goal for me. The aim 
was to achieve valuable insights into the research question and as much information as 
possible.  
Finding Respondents: snowball sampling of elites and experts 
When conducting interviews, it is important that the interviews are tailored to the purpose of 
the study and what one wants to investigate (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 673). An 
important step in the process is to identify respondents that can best answer the questions 
prepared (Creswell, 2013: 164). As mentioned above, elite representatives will provide 
valuable insights to the field of interest. They can provide crucial information about the state 
of the judiciary, and are of great importance in shedding light on the case. The respondents 
can further provide technical knowledge that they are in a better position to have access to 
than me, in addition to interpretative knowledge which covers their personal thoughts on the 
issue of judicial independence and development. This emphasizes the need for data 
triangulation, as the respondents can provide information that is colored by their personal 
beliefs (Bogner and Manz, 2009: 52).  
The biggest challenge when doing elite interviews, or any type of interviewing for that matter, 
is finding relevant people who are willing to talk to you. I knew that my results would be 
affected by the people I talked to, and it was therefore important to consider wisely which 
respondents to contact. I wanted to talk to actors who had knowledge about the processes that 
I was researching, and that meant primarily people within the judicial system, judges and 
legal assistants, academics and politicians. It turned out to be a lot harder than expected to get 
a hold of people of interest in Hungary. People were busy, and generally slow in replying to 
electronic communication. This proved to be a general problem when trying to communicate 
with respondents in Hungary: there is a lot of bureaucracy, and most people do not respond 
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quickly via email. Web pages of judicial institutions seldom include contact information to 
judges and legal assistants, and are often only available in Hungarian.
4
 
Though, as I was able to get in contact with several academics and secretaries in various 
institutions, I was able to secure some interview appointments before traveling to Budapest in 
November 2013. These respondents could help me come in contact with new respondents in 
other areas of the Hungarian state organization, and through persistence and relentless use of 
the snowballing as a sample strategy, in which I asked respondents if they knew, or could 
recommend anyone else that I should interview, I was able to conduct more interviews than I 
could have hoped for. I had a number of appointments, and the respondents included a wide 
variety of academics, law clerks, judges, politicians and journalists. When selecting the 
sample of the study through the snowball strategy, respondents are asked to recommend 
further respondents to the sample (Grønmo, 2007: 102). An important aim when selecting 
respondents was to include people from different political factions and organizations, in order 
to avoid bias. As I had to have some understanding of the core of the issue beforehand, I knew 
that I was especially prone to the problem of bias. Talking to people representing different 
factions could help me avoid unbalanced and biased information, and thus increase the 
internal validity of my findings (Yin, 2009: 72). One danger with such sampling is that the 
respondents can suggest other respondents who share some similar characteristics (Tansey, 
2007: 19). However, as I focused on selecting representatives of all political factions, as well 
as academics writing in favor of different sides, I think I managed to ensure that the initial set 
of respondents were sufficiently diverse and not skewed excessively in one particular 
direction. Nevertheless, I sought to come in contact with all political parties in Hungary, but 
as the parliamentary election was coming up shortly (in April 2014), most of them were 
simply too busy to meet me for an interview. That can affect the reliability and internal 
validity of my thesis. Though, overall I felt that the set of respondents represented the breadth 
of state organization in Hungary.  
The Interview Guide and the Interview Process 
Before the interview process began, I had to obtain approval from NSD 
 
(Norsk 
Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste AS) that the study could be carried out in accordance with 
                                                          
4
 I am thankful for the help of Katrine Steinfeld, Political Advisor for Slovenia, The Royal Norwegian Embassy in 
Budapest, for translating contact information to relevant institutions and navigating me through the Hungarian 
“jungle” of relevant foundations and organizations.   
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privacy policy.
5
 The approval came just before departure to Budapest, and made it possible 
for me to conduct the necessary interviews.  
As mentioned previously, I chose to do semi structured interviews with all my respondents. I 
made an interview guide, which was revised several times through the process. The guide was 
simple in its design, and contained only wide questions that I could use as guidelines during 
the interview session. Each interview had its own dynamic, and depending on whom I talked 
to, different parts and questions in the guide were emphasized in different interviews. When 
meeting the respondents I asked them to sign a consent form, in which they agreed to 
participate in the study. The form also included information concerning procedures for storage 
of data and personal information, as well as procedures for citation.
6
 I always obtained the 
respondents’ contact information, so that I was able to contact them for clarifications, 
elaborations or follow-up questions.  
When developing the interview guide I was very cautious as to avoid biased questions that 
could steer the respondents’ answers in a certain direction. Though, as I often ended up asking 
one broad open-ended question that allowed the respondent to elaborate for a while, and then 
asking follow-up questions, this was not really a problem for me. Still, I kept in mind that I 
had to avoid leading and biased questions, and was further aware of the fact that my presence 
and behavior could shape the interview situation. However, I never got the impression that the 
respondents were trying to please me and thus formed opinions that they had not held before 
the interview. In fact, I was several times amazed by the directness and honesty that most 
respondents met me with. I conducted two interviews in which the respondent, because of 
occupation within diplomacy, did not want to be quoted by name.
7
 However, as their 
perspective was mostly in line with the perspective of other respondents, this had a limited 
impact on the data collection. In order to strengthen reliability, I have only used data from 
respondents who agreed to be quoted by name.  
2.3.2 Other Data Sources: Data Triangulating using Documentation  
When conducting an exploratory study, it is encouraged to collect information from various 
sources of evidence that are aimed at explaining the same phenomenon.  Data collected 
                                                          
5
 A main focus when preparing for fieldwork was to make sure that the respondents were protected in terms of 
privacy policy. I had to account for how the data would be stored, and for how long, and who would have 
access to the data.  
6
 All quotes are approved by respondents  
7
 The two respondents are not included in the list of respondents in Appendix 1, in order to ensure full 
anonymity.  
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through interviews should be compared to data obtained through other means whenever 
possible, as that can increase the likehood that the researcher is on the right track.  
Corroborating statements from my  interviews with data from other sources, such as 
documents, is therefore useful in order to increase the reliability of the data and to ensure that 
different sources point in the same direction (Yin, 2009: 115). Furthermore, when adding data 
from other sources of evidence to the study, it can help fill in gaps in the researcher’s 
knowledge – being a result of forgetting to ask certain questions to a respondent or because 
none of the respondents mentioned that particular information.  
The most important source of evidence besides interviews was documentation, which 
basically includes all written documents that are of relevance to the case being studied. Such 
information is likely to be relevant to all case studies, and should be used in order to 
corroborate evidence from other sources. Documents are further helpful in verifying unclear 
information, unclear spelling and names of organizations and other facts that might have been 
mentioned in the interviews (Yin, 2009: 103). As my study is an exploratory one, 
documentation is useful in explaining the phenomenon under scrutiny, together with the data 
collected from interviews. I used documents prior to the field work in order to gather 
invaluable information that could help to prepare the interview situation, and have further 
relied on documents that could provide empirical evidence that otherwise would have been 
hard to find. Yin (2009: 102) emphasizes the importance of not taking everything that is 
presented in writing as a fact, and stresses the need to be aware of biased and incomplete 
documentation.  
2.4 Data Availability: Validity and Reliability 
The quality of data obtained through a research study is based on a critical discussion of two 
essential factors: validity and reliability. If the data that the conclusion of a study is building 
inference from are of high validity and reliability, then the data is of high quality (Grønmo, 
2007: 219). There are four tests that can be used when establishing the quality of an empirical 
research study: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 
2009: 40). This section will consider these tests of quality in relation to the data collected and 
applied in this study.  
2.4.1 Validity  
Validity can be characterized as the data material’s relevance to the research process, and it 
includes that the operationalization and choice of cases adequately reflects the concept the 
researcher is aiming to measure (Grønmo, 2007: 221). That means that you should always 
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ensure that you are measuring what you want to measure, and therefore be careful when 
choosing data that can answer the research question. As this study seeks to understand the 
development of the judicial institutions in terms of judicial independence and authority, an 
operationalization of relevant concepts are particularly important. I will argue that doing an 
in-depth single case study, based on data triangulation of different sources of data, is an 
advantage in order to avoid problems of measurement validity. The use of both 
documentation and in-depth interviews reduces the risk of errors of measurement, and 
strengthen the validity of the study. Nonetheless, I still need to consider all pieces of evidence 
before including them as a part of the study, or drawing conclusions based on them, in order 
to avoid evidence that doesn’t investigate or enlighten the subject.  
Internal validity is mainly a problem for explanatory cases studies, and concerns the threat of 
seeking to establish a causal relationship between the independent variable X, and the 
dependent variable Y, without taking into consideration that a third factor may have caused 
the outcome, instead of the expected factor (Yin, 2009: 40-42). However, the qualitative, 
descriptive approach of this study controls for most of the possible problems caused by 
inadequate internal validity (Gerring, 2007: 43), and when using a process tracing method the 
internal validity is strengthened through the thorough focus on the within-case and the number 
of data sourced used (Gerring, 2007: 184).  
External validity deals with problems regarding whether the findings of a study are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 2009: 43). The problem of external 
validity or the applicability to a broader – unstudied - population has been a focus in case 
studies for a very long time. The case study criticism focuses on how single case studies are 
less suitable for generalization than large-N studies (Gerring, 2007: 43). The scope of my 
research question limits the investigative reach of the study to the Hungarian case, and the 
generalizing strength of the thesis is therefore weak. Though, as the theory of judicial 
independence can help to explain other cases, the result of this study may be generalizable to 
some extent.  
2.4.2 Reliability  
Reliability is an important test when assessing the quality of a research design. The test strive 
replicability, which means that if other researchers were to conduct the same type of study, 
following the same procedures as described by the earlier researcher, their findings and 
conclusions would coincide. The goal of this test is to limit and minimize the errors and biases 
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in the study. An important prerequisite in order to make the study reproducible is the 
documentation of the procedures and the data that the study is based on. The guideline should 
be to conduct the study in such a way that another researcher could repeat the procedure and 
retrace the results (Yin, 2009: 45). This study is based on data gathered through interviews 
and documentations. The data is available through thorough transcriptions and audio 
recordings from the interviews. In addition, there exists data bases in which I have gathered 
documents containing the empirical data used in this thesis that are open for all interested. 
This makes the replicability of the results of this study possible.  
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CHAPTER 3 - A Theoretical Framework 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical framework for explaining changes in judicial 
independence and authority, understood as the ability and willingness of courts to say “no” to 
the government when it oversteps its authority. I will start by clarifying and operationalizing 
the dependent variable, judicial independence and authority (which in the following will be 
referred to simply as judicial independence), before searching the literature to identify 
independent variables that potentially can explain the shifts, and thus help uncover the causes 
for the observed development in the dependent variable.  
As proxy for judicial independence I propose to look at the extent to which courts deliver 
judgments that carry political costs for the government, and refrain from passing judgments 
that are deferential to the government in situations where they should have said “no”. 8 
In order to explain judicial independence, understood as “passing judgments with political 
costs for the government”, two sets of variables are identified: (1) the formal framework 
providing judges with more or less ability to act independently, and (2) factors influencing the 
willingness of judicial actors to act in an independent manner. The formal framework again 
falls in two parts: (a) the legal and structural framework that influences judicial independence 
through regulations regarding appointment, tenure and resources, insulating the judiciary from 
political interference, and (b) the formal regulation and protection of the courts’ jurisdiction 
that secures judicial authority. These factors affect the ability of courts to act independent. 
The factors influencing the willingness of judicial actors to realize the potential for 
independence operate in conjunction with the formal framework, and include the legal culture 
within the judiciary. The corporate culture, or the professional self-understanding and ‘norms 
of appropriateness’ guiding judges in their work, influence their willingness to use the formal 
framework. The corporate culture can change with new judicial personnel.  
Both the formal framework for judicial independence and authority and the willingness of 
judges to act independently can be influenced by underlying variables, such as the political 
context, the balance of power in a society, the legal culture, and the presence of protective 
constituencies (Gloppen, 2004: 112-113). This in turn affects manifest judicial independence, 
the dependent variable, understood as the extents to which judges deliver judgments that carry 
a political cost for the government. There is also a potential feed-back loop in the sense that 
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 This is obviously no straightforward assessment to make, and involves value judgments that will inevitably be 
contested, as will be further discussed below.  
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when the observed manifest judicial independence is high, there is increased likelihood that 
political authorities will attempt to reign in the judiciary through reforms limiting their formal 
authority and/or independence.  
3.1 The Judicial Independence, Authority and Accountability Function of Courts: A 
Framework for Inquiry 
An emerging body of works provides definitions of both the concept of judicial independence, 
judicial authority and accountability, which is widely considered to be important conditions 
for the establishment of the rule of law (Guarnieri, 2014). While judicial authority concerns 
the formal powers of the courts, does judicial independence include the framework that 
protects the courts from internal and external influence. Accountability is the courts’ ability to 
“say no and make it stick” (Gloppen et al., 2010: 12-13). This chapter introduces a useful 
working concept of the terms, in order to ensure consistent use of them.  The concepts are all 
connected, and that is why I include all three. 
3.1.1 Judicial Independence 
The concept of judicial independence is a well-studied field, but there lacks one single, 
satisfactory definition that embraces the concept in an organized manner. Independence in 
general, at a very basic level, is related to the impartial resolution of conflicts by a neutral 
third party, and embedded within the notion of judicial independence is a belief that judges 
will not be influenced by exogenous factors while adjudicating in disputes and conflicts 
(Guarnieri, 2014). For the judiciary to be perceived as impartial and independent, it must not 
be viewed as an extension of the political branches of the government. For the public to 
believe that the judiciary is a legitimate component of a triadic structure, rather than a 
politically biased actor, it is necessary that the judiciary appears to be impartial. An 
independent judiciary is free to exercise judgments in legal disputes, without having to fear 
consequences in terms of retribution – especially in cases where the decisions are not viewed 
favorably by other political actors. Though, while an independent judiciary should not feel 
compelled to uphold unlawful actions, they should neither interfere with legitimate actions of 
the other political branches (Herron and Randazzo, 2003 : 423-424). Furthermore, an 
independent judiciary does not imply an irresponsible judiciary that act independently of the 
law or in disregard of important considerations, but rather, on the contrary, that the judiciary 
has substantial power and a responsibility to decide in cases in accordance with already 
established rules and procedural law. That signifies that the judiciary must be held 
accountable for the misuse of that power  (Rosenn, 1987: 4).  
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Becker (1970) provides a commonly cited definition of judicial independence:  
“Judicial independence is (a) the degree to which judges believe they can decide and 
do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values and conceptions of 
judicial role (in their interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others, who 
have or are believed to have political or judicial power, think about or desire in like 
matters, and (c) particularly when a decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those 
with political or judicial power may bring some retribution on the judges personally or 
on the power of the court.” 
 (Becker, 1970: 144) 
Rosenn (1987) finds that this definition needs further refinement, as it simplistically combines 
two complex principles: independence from political authorities and independence from other 
judges. When the main issue is the independence of the judiciary as a corporate body rather 
than internal independence of an individual judge from other judges, quite different 
considerations pertain. In modern legal systems, courts are typically arranged in a hierarchical 
order, where judges in lower courts are expected or required to adhere to the decisions of 
higher courts, in order to secure predictability, uniformity and judicial administration. In 
general, and as a practical matter, lower courts tend to follow decisions of the higher courts, 
and therefore, when literally applied, Becker’s definition implies that the only countries with 
truly independent judiciaries are those that give judges permission to ignore decisions of the 
higher courts. Though, judicial independence does not rely on a system in which lower courts 
are free to ignore the decisions of the higher courts. The definition further ignores the crucial 
role of the courts in finding and interpreting the facts – as well as the law. Interpretation of the 
law may not even matter if judges interpret and determine the facts in a skewed manner. 
Moreover, one last difficulty with the definition above is that it ignores the role of private 
actors in undermining judicial independence, through bribery or intimidation. If a judge’s vote 
can be purchased by money or favors, then it is hardly independent. Neither is a judge 
independent if the judge is motivated by fear for his personal safety (Rosenn, 1987: 5-7).  
The need for improvement of Becker’s definition caused Rosenn (1987: 7) to define judicial 
independence in a more simplified manner:  
“Judicial independence could be defined as the degree to which judges actually decide 
cases in accordance with their own determinations of the evidence, the law and justice, 
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free from coercion, blandishments, interference, or threats of governmental authorities 
or private citizens.” 
(Rosenn, 1987: 7) 
The concept if further emphasized by Ferejohn (1998) as an idea with both internal (or 
normative) and external (or institutional) aspects.  Judges should, from a normative viewpoint, 
act as autonomous moral agents, who can be relied on to carry out the public duties given to 
them – independent of ideological and personal considerations.  In this sense, independence, 
or impartiality, is a desirable aspect of a judge’s character, and the idea that a judge ought to 
be free to decide the case before them without fear or anticipation of illegitimate punishments 
and rewards is therefore a central meaning of the concept. Though, another meaning of the 
concept is less common, but applies to courts and the judicial system as a whole. Judges are 
only human, and the matters they decide on are of great importance to people.  It is therefore 
necessary to provide institutional shields against possible threats or temptations that might 
influence judges’ decisions – and ensure that the system protects the independence of the 
institutions. Judicial independence, in this sense, is a “feature of the institutional setting 
within which judging takes place” (Ferejohn 1998: 353). The concept is, however, a complex 
value in the sense that it is not something valuable in itself. Instead, it is instrumental to the 
pursuit of other important values in a democracy, such as the rule of law or constitutional 
values (Ferejohn, 1998: 355). The selection of judges is a central factor in most theories of 
judicial independence, and it is emphasized that judges who are dependent in some ways upon 
the person who appoints them cannot be relied upon to deliver decisions that are of high 
quality, both in terms of neutrality and legitimacy (Garoupa and Ginsburg 2009 : 201-202).  
3.1.2 Judicial Authority  
The court’s authority function refers to the formal powers of the court, and the ability to gain 
the respect of other branches. It further includes the extent to which their decisions actually 
influence political behavior and the policy process (Gloppen, 2004: 121). Judicial power 
depends on a wide variety of institutional factors, such as constitutional review, access to 
courts, and the status and role of prosecution. It further depends on political conditions, for 
instance fragmentation (Guarnieri, 2014: 6). Judicial independence is made dependent on the 
extent of judicial authority, but a distinction between the concepts must always be kept: the 
two concepts are different, although closely related. A judiciary with reduced powers can still 
be independent (Guarnieri, 2014: 6-7). 
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3.1.3 Accountability Function of Courts  
While the focus of this thesis is on the concepts of judicial independence and authority, 
accountability is a concept that is equally important – and it is an important theme in the 
debate concerning courts role in a democratic system, especially as the conditions for this role 
is about to change.  
The concept of accountability has been at the center of several scholarly debates since the 
early 1990s, and is an essential part of the literature on democracy, democratization, the rule 
of law and judicial activism, among others. The concept is broad, but a general idea is that 
accountability embraces different ways of preventing and redressing the abuse of political 
power. Accountability implies that the use of power is subject to the threat of sanctions, 
oblige power to be exercised in a transparent way and emphasize the importance of justifying 
acts. Enforcement, monitoring and justification are three aspects that define accountability, 
and these aspects turn political accountability into something that copes both with actual and 
potential abuses of power (Schedler, 1999: 18-21). 
The concept of accountability is a fundamental function of courts in any modern democracy, 
and can be seen as both vertical accountability, in which people have the power to challenge, 
remove and replace the ruler, and horizontal accountability, where law and the separation of 
powers limit the power (Gloppen, Wilson, Gargarella, Skaar and Kinander 2010: 13). Political 
accountability entails a relationship of power between two actors: citizens, who are the 
principals with the legitimate political authority, and the rulers, who are the citizens’ agents. 
The relationship is built on an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions as the basis 
for legitimate rule. The citizens entrust the rulers with authority, and the rulers are therefore 
obliged to keep the citizens (or their representatives) informed about processes and decisions, 
as well as to offer explanations and justification for these decisions. If the account is not 
satisfactory, or if the rulers fail to do what is expected of them, the citizens may impose 
predetermined sanctions (Gloppen et al., 2010: 13). O’Donnell  (1999:14-15) defines the 
concept of accountability as the ability of actors to ensure that officials in government and 
state institutions are answerable for their actions, and associate the terms answerability and 
enforcement as the closest synonyms to the concept. Answerability because it indicates that 
being accountable to somebody implies the obligation to respond to questions, and that 
holding somebody accountability implies the opportunity to ask questions that can ensure that 
the right to receive information is upheld. Enforcement because it is necessary that the 
accounting actors don’t just ask questions, but that they also eventually punish improper 
25 
 
behavior and make sure that the accountable actors bear the consequences for their actions, 
including eventual negative sanctions (O'Donnell, 1999: 14-15).  
In a democratic context, political accountability refers to a hierarchical relationship in which 
the people have the power to challenge, replace, and even remove the ruler. This is what the 
literature refers to as vertical accountability – and this kind of accountability is 
institutionalized principally through election. There is a broad agreement on the importance of 
such mechanisms, and, while there of course are disagreements on how to secure vertical 
accountability, there are also an agreement that accountability in the terms described above is 
the main procedural mechanism of democracy. Courts are a part of a vertical accountability 
relationship that is legally specified by serving as a mechanism for popular control or societal 
accountability by enabling individuals and groups to use litigation in order to protect and 
advance their rights and interests (Gloppen et al., 2010: 16). The literature further refers to 
horizontal accountability, which is a much more debated concept that deals with 
accountability relationships between different state institutions. The concept involves the 
relationship in which bodies within the state are given a legal mandate to control other state 
institutions. These state institutions are in turn obliged to account for how they have exercised 
the powers that they have been given and entrusted with. The different agencies in an 
horizontal accountability relationship are institutionally independent, and the state institutions  
can either be given an independent mandate from the voters (as is the case in presidential 
systems, where there is strict separation of powers between the legislature and the executive) 
or act as controller (ombudspersons, courts, supreme audit institutions and forth), appointed 
and funded by one or more of the institutions that they are set to hold accountable (the 
executive and/or the parliament)(Gloppen et al., 2010: 13-14).  
Courts also have a horizontal accountability function, as they are crucial to the system of 
accountability between state agencies – and to hold other state actors to the law and the 
constitution (Gloppen et al., 2010: 16). A definition of the concept involves 
“The existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions 
or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the 
state that may be qualified as unlawful.” 
 (O'Donnell, 1999: 38) 
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O'Donnell (2003) further argues that accountability is as a relationship based on a law where a 
party is obligated to explain (answerability) and the other authorized to sanction 
(controllability). The definition has been criticized as being too narrow when defining 
horizontal accountability as relations that only deal with relationships within the legal fram. 
Critics suggest including all activities that involve holding public officials accountable for 
their unlawful actions, not only when the relationship is formal and legally regulated by the 
state, as accountability (Gloppen et al., 2010).  
3.2 The Dependent Variable: The Judicial Independence and Authority of Courts 
In order to discuss specifically how judicial independence can be assessed and compared over 
time, a general discussion of the dependent variable is required.  
There is a set of assumptions about what the courts are supposed to do, combined with a 
shared understanding of what is required and expected in order to uphold and maintain a well-
functioning democracy. The courts play an important, but not undisputed, role in protecting 
the genuine competition for positions of political power, equal opportunities for political 
participation, political space for deliberation and contestation of political decisions and the 
protection of basic rights. These concerns, as well as the courts’ role in protecting these rights, 
are not undisputed: there is a century-long debate about the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy. The factors adopted here are all formulated to be 
compatible with different notions of democracy – and there is a shared understanding of these 
factors as central concerns in all democracies. Courts are central to the endeavor of holding 
political bodies and officeholders accountable for illegitimate use of political power and 
neglect of responsibilities, and are therefore the key to a stable and well-functioning 
democracy. Still, the specific actions that courts should, as well as have the opportunity to, 
take depend on the political and institutional context and their position within the structure of 
other accountability institutions (Gloppen et al., 2010: 18-19). 
Courts are expected to enhance democracy by clearing the channels of political change and 
protect basic rights – especially the rights of disadvantaged minorities, as they are particularly 
vulnerable to being marginalized. Furthermore, courts are crucial in securing periodic 
elections. The electoral process is the only institutionalized channel for control of political 
power-holders for the people in a modern democracy, and it is especially important to secure 
that this channel functions properly and fairly. Courts play an important role in securing that 
the integrity and trustworthiness of the electoral process are high, and they are expected to do 
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so through appellate jurisdiction where the courts demand compliance with the rules of the 
game and sanction illegal electoral activities. A proxy for judicial independence is whether 
courts deliver judgments with political costs for the government, and refrain from passing 
judgments that are favorable to the government in situations where they should have said “no”  
(Gloppen et al., 2010: 18-22).  
3.3 Explaining Judicial Independence, Authority and Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework for Comparative Analysis 
The aim of this section is to create a framework that can explain variations in the dependent 
variable: judicial independence, understood as the extent to which judges deliver judgments 
that carry political costs for the government. The next section discusses the most dominant 
theories provided by the literature, and integrates insights from various approaches – with a 
goal of enhanced understanding of the dynamics at play. 
3.3.1 The Formal Framework: the Institutional Structure 
The formal framework includes a range of structural and institutional factors that are believed 
to protect the independence and authority of the judiciary, and their ability to set limits for the 
government’s exercise of power and act independent. The legal framework defines the powers 
and jurisdiction of the courts’, regulations and organization of the judiciary – and the 
resources available to them (Gloppen, 2004: 123).  
The formal framework often forms the dominant basis for the study of judicial reform 
policies. The literature that focuses on institutional design assumes that variations in judicial 
independence stem from differences in the judicial institution. That makes institutional 
structures relevant for the study of the Hungarian judiciary. Indicators to consider are judicial 
appointment procedures, protection of tenure and terms of service and sufficiency of 
resources (Gloppen, 2004: 113). Such structural factors define the boundaries within which 
legal actors and institutions operate. Explanations focusing on institutional design are built on 
literature that focuses on structural factors as a fundamental condition for the ability of courts 
to act independent (Rosenn, 1987: 13). The institutional design-centered approach to the study 
of judicial authority and independence is reflected in both a variety of frameworks for 
assessment of judicial independence, policies of judicial reform and legal-political documents 
(Gloppen et al., 2010: 25). 
There are various assumptions about the effects and importance of particular institutional 
features in institutional design-centered approaches, but most of them share a focus on a 
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common list of institutional factors. Arrangements that can provide the judiciary with 
structural independence from the political branches is the predominant focus among the more 
theoretically centered, and informed, institutional design literature. The emphasis of this 
literature lies primarily on appointment procedures, procedures for promoting, disciplining 
and removing judges, protection of judge’s tenure, the judiciary’s autonomy over their budget 
and the security for and adequacy of remuneration (in terms of salaries and perks) (Gloppen et 
al., 2010: 25). This is further emphasized by Rosenn (1987:13-22), who focuses on the 
importance of measures that are designed to protect and insure the independence of the 
judiciary, and formal regulations of the courts’ jurisdiction that can secure judicial authority. 
This includes the adequacy of a formal framework that forms the basis for how courts are to 
develop their authority functions, as well as the formal constitutional mandate given to the 
courts. The empowerment of courts through formal regulations can strengthen the jurisdiction, 
and thus the political authority of courts. Court’s control over their caseload is included here. 
The availability of resources, in terms of infrastructure, staff, running costs, legal material and 
training, is also a factor that the literature emphasize as something that affects the judiciary’s 
ability to act independent of other institutions. The provisions of resources that are available 
to the courts determine their ability to, in an effective manner, process cases and deliver 
judgments. However, not only the volume of resources, but also the sources of funding and 
security of resources are central in this matter. Last, recruitment patterns, training and 
education can affect the professional competence of the judiciary, including the personal and 
professional qualities of the judges on the bench. Professional forums can help to establish 
these professional standards, and make professional reputation matter (Gloppen et al., 2010: 
25-26).  
Rosenn (1987: 13-14) emphasizes the importance of legal measures that can guarantee 
judicial independence, both by protecting the integrity of judicial decision-making processes 
from pressure from outside and by protecting the personal independence of judges. The most 
common measure to ensure the integrity of judicial processes is a constitutional prohibition 
against interferences by other branches of government with proceedings by the judiciary. 
Furthermore, in order to protect the personal independence of judges, there are certain 
measures that are needed. Judges should be protected from financial retribution for rendering 
decisions that displease the legislature or the executive, and it is therefore necessary to secure 
the irreducibility of judicial salaries. Financial independence has been emphasized as an 
important measure to ensure judicial independence. In addition, to protect the judges’ 
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independence by providing that their compensation is not diminished during their term of 
office, a second technique is a constitutional requirement that a fixed percentage of the 
government’s total budget should be allocated to the judicial institution. A third way of 
securing personal judicial independence is a constitutional guarantee of tenure in office, for 
instance by assuring lifetime tenure for judges pending good behavior or protected tenure in 
office pending good behavior until a specified retirement age (Rosenn, 1987: 13-19).  
Furthermore, the selection and reappointment processes of judges are critical in ensuring an 
independent judiciary. For instance, constitutions with selection processes that involve 
multiple bodies in the appointment and removal of judges are usually associated with higher 
levels of judicial independence (Guarnieri, 2014: 5). If the executive branch is entrusted with 
the task of selecting candidates, without constraints, then the risk of appointing unqualified 
candidates or persons, selected primarily on the basis of political or personal motives becomes 
exceedingly high. Consequently, it is therefore necessary to set forth a minimum of 
qualifications for members of courts. Popular election of judges are mostly eschewed, based 
on a perception that such a measure could compromise judicial independence by forcing 
judges to involve themselves in political activity. The tendency in the highest courts 
throughout the world is therefore that the executive select the judges, either with some form 
of legislative or judicial approval as a check, or from a prepared list by the judiciary or the 
legislature of prescreened candidates (Rosenn, 1987: 19-21). To further enhance judicial 
independence, theory emphasizes the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest. It is 
common practice to prohibit, by law, judges from engaging in political and economic 
activities, in order to avoid conflicts and ambiguous situations. In return, the constitution 
should protect judges against involuntary transfers, as such transfers can be regarded as an 
invitation to resign, and the lack of constraints on transferences can compromise personal 
judicial independence (Rosenn, 1987: 21-22). 
However, there is a problem with much of the institutional design theory today. The literature 
presented above seems to take for granted that the institutional structure operates in a vacuum 
and there is not enough appreciation for how the design of such legal-political institutions is 
influenced by the sociopolitical context. The judicial institution is not determined by such 
context, but it is, whether emerging over centuries or developed as part of a reform process, 
shaped by the political and social context in which they operate within – and when promoting 
the judicial institution, it is necessary to come to grips with how this influences judicial 
independence (Carothers, 2006: 55-62). While the formal framework influences the courts’ 
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ability to act independent, the corporate culture affects the judges’ willingness to realize their 
potential for independence. The willingness can change if there are alterations in the judicial 
personnel. Furthermore, the political context can act as an underlying variable, and influence 
the formal framework and the willingness of judges.  
3.3.2 Actor-Based Explanations: the Corporative Culture  
A wide range of studies focusing on courts and legal institutions attempt to explain the 
behavior of judges and judicial institutions by focusing on the individual qualities of the 
judges. There is a prolific strand of such actor-centered approaches, and the different 
approaches describe various assumptions about what makes judges act the way they do. The 
internal standards, created by the judiciary itself, that judges are incorporated into, or the legal 
aspect of the system, are of high importance when trying to explain why some courts appear 
to be more independent than others.  
The courts’ willingness to act in an independent manner is affected by the professional, self-
understanding and ‘norms of appropriateness’ that guide judges in their work. Particularly 
important is the judges’ own understanding of what their role should be in a democratic 
system vis-á-vis the executive, and that the judges are motivated by the norms prevalent in the 
institution within which they operate. Judges’ behavior is further influenced by the collective 
conceptions within the society of how a good judge should act (Gloppen, 2004: 122). The 
corporate culture affecting the courts’ willingness to act independently can change with the 
appointment of new judicial personnel. This makes it relevant for the Hungarian case.  
Attitudinal approaches assume that judges’ ideology matters, and focus on how values and 
preferences of judges can help to explain the decisions of the court. Such an approach 
emphasizes judges’ ideology, moral and political orientation, as well as other factors that are 
assumed to be relevant to their identity – and understand judicial decisions as something that 
directly reflects the policy preferences of judges. The assumption is that judges act non-
strategically, and do not engage in exchange of support or favors or care about how other 
institutions react to their judgments. Class background, religion and ethnicity are the most 
relevant identity markers – but these may vary between contexts (Gloppen et al., 2010: 26-
27). Dahl (1957) was the first to challenge the view of what has been called the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. Based on empirical evidence, he demonstrated that “the Supreme 
Court of a nation is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance and, as an element in 
the political leadership of the political dominance; the Court of course supports the major 
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policies of the alliance” (Dahl, 1957: 293). The work of Dahl (1957) implied that the court, 
instead of serving as a counter-majoritarian power, tended to be a pro-majoritarian institution, 
thus reflecting prevailing political preferences that influenced judicial decisions. Embedded in 
a claim about the attitudinal model is an assumption about the decision-making of the 
judiciary – namely that judicial decisions are a function of the political preferences of the 
judiciary. Therefore, if the Court legitimizes other branches of government’s policies, it is not, 
according to Dahl, because they have made an a priori decision to do so, but because they are 
motivated by their personal ideologies. The tendency is that the Court reinforces the 
prevailing policies of the political majorities by voting in alignment with their sincere 
preferences. They do so because the selection process is biased in favor of choosing judges 
who have political preferences that are consistent with those of the incumbent government - 
political preferences that are in accord with their sincere preferences, but which, again, 
happens to coincide with the preferences of the ruling regime. The alignment of preferences 
can also help to explain why politicians selected them in the first place (Epstein et al., 2001: 
587). 
Though, as Epstein et al. (2001: 587-588) emphasizes, Dahl was writing at the time of the 
behavioralism movement in the 1950s – a movement that influenced the study of Courts by 
using the attitudinal model, a model that claims that justices base their decisions solely on the 
actual cases vis-á-vis their ideological preferences. Based on this model, ideology is the only 
factor that actually comes into play - and the model is what undergirds Dahl’s thesis about the 
ruling regime. The ruling regime will select justices whose preferences are in alignment with, 
and reflect, their own preferences. Those justices will, in turn, vote in according to their 
sincere ideologies, which due to the appointment procedure is likely to the same ideologies as 
the politicians. That legitimizes the interests of the ruling regime (Gloppen et al., 2010: 26-
29).  
Rational choice approaches focus on the strategic self-interest of judges in order to understand 
the decisions of the court. Such an approach implies a necessary focus on the judges’ 
incentive structures – a structure that is usually defined by both the institutional and context 
variables that are discussed in this chapter. An example of this approach is the strategic 
defection thesis, which includes both the political balance of power and the predictability of 
the political context
9
 as crucial factors when determining whether judges find it to be in their 
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 Understood as who will be in power after the next election 
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interest to hold the executive accountable. When judges face opportunities for recognition and 
careers, it may create incentives that motivate judges to act out their accountability function 
(Gloppen et al., 2010: 27). Concerns for prestige, career ambitions and other personal interests 
influence the decisions of judges, and the personal incentive structure that judges are faced 
with is therefore relevant. Issues of personal background, values and life experience may 
influence their decisions and actions (Gloppen, forthcoming 2014). Varieties of both 
attitudinal and rational choice approaches have in common that they assume that judges are 
motivated by preferences, values of “higher order” and ideologies. This momentum can 
motivate them to act in a strategic manner, and thereby sacrifice preferences that are more 
short-term (for instance, ensuring that the executive act accountable) in order to secure the 
“higher-order” interest (Gloppen et al., 2010: 27).  
A critique of the attitudinal model is that it is too focused on judges as single-minded actors 
that, without exception, vote according to their personal preference (Gloppen et al., 2010: 28). 
Judges are dependent on other actors, for instance other judges, and institutions – and it is 
necessary to pay attention to how the relevant others behave in relation to the court and its 
decisions. This can cause judges to vote in ways that doesn’t necessary reflect their personal 
ideology, but rather in ways that ensure what they see as the second best solution, given the 
existing political constraints (Knight, 1992: 191-193). Other authors, on the other hand, claim 
that courts try to decide in alignment with the public in order to ensure compliance with the 
decisions they make and to keep a certain level of public legitimacy. Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 
(2000) write about societal accountability as a phenomenon where citizens act with an aim at 
overseeing political authorities, including politicians, judges and bureaucrats. There are 
different ways for the public to influence courts, but common to them all is how voice is the 
mechanism that is available for control. This form for control can be exercised in many ways, 
but a tendency is that the public exercise pressure directly through the other political 
branches, reach out to the courts directly with demands or organize demonstrations against the 
courts or some of their members (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000: 148-152). This is 
emphasized by empirical studies by Mishler and Sheehan (1993), who found a relationship 
between public opinion and the ideology of the Supreme Court’s decisions – a relationship 
that was a result of such pressures. According to their study, the decisions of the Court both 
reflect changes in the ideology of the public mood and serve to reinforce and legitimize 
opinion change in what can be said to be a iterative process (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993: 96). 
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However, the strategic model has, most typically, focused on how other branches of power 
influence the judges’ decisions. Those in favor of this model argue that the opinions of 
justices are written with an eye on the other branches. Judges are highly aware of the fact that 
other political branches have the power to change the composition of the courts by appointing 
judges from other ideologies, change the size of the courts, and even, in extreme cases that is, 
impeach some or all of the judges. These are all threats that are more radical than having their 
decisions overturned (Helmke, 2002: 292). Attempts from other branches to combat them, 
deliberately fail to implement the orders given to them from the courts, reform the system of 
judicial review, change the salaries, perks and benefits of the judges, amend the constitution, 
or cut the court’s budget can generate serious consequences for the courts (Gloppen et al., 
2010: 28). Epstein et al. (2001: 592) argue that both the attitudinal and the strategic model are 
based on the idea that justices are “single-minded seekers of legal policy”, but from thereon 
out, the two approaches diverge. The strategic approach assumes that justices cannot, if they 
want to maintain the ultimate state of law, as suggested by attitudinalists and Dahl, vote 
according to their own sincere ideological preferences as if they were operating alone. It is 
instead expected that the justices are “attentive to the preferences of other institutions and the 
actions that they expect them to take if they want to generate enduring policy” (Epstein et al., 
2001: 592). This may help to explain why situations sometimes arise where the justices avoid 
adopting decisions that manifestly defy what other institutions, such as the executive power, 
regard as acceptable; even when this challenges their own sincerely held preferences. This 
model is called the separation of powers model (Gloppen et al., 2010: 28).  
Helmke (2002: 293- 294) extends the force of the separation-of-powers argument to more 
judicially politicized and unstable environments, and argue that courts in more stable contexts 
tend to adjust their opinions and decisions to those of the current government, while unstable 
and shifting environments can cause interaction between the courts and the government’s 
successors in order to avoid being punished by the coming authorities. The concept of 
strategic defection, first coined by Helmke (2002), emphasizes how an institutionally unstable 
setting can cause a reverse legal-political cycle in which there is an increased opposition from 
the justices once they sense that the current government is losing power, and decreased 
opposition when the incumbents grow stronger. The concept generates both a hypothesis that 
judges will increase their rulings against the incumbent government once there emerge a 
prospect that the current government will lose power, and a hypothesis that the judges use 
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strategic defection to concentrate about cases that are considered to be most important to the 
incoming government (Helmke, 2002: 294).  
3.3.3 The Social, Legal, and Political Context 
Underlying variables, such as the political context, the balance of power, the legal culture and 
the existence of protective constituencies can explain variations in the ability and willingness 
of courts to act in an independent manner. Such factors are believed to be of high relevance in 
the case of Hungary. Common for most of these variables is a focus on factors outside the 
judiciary – and the tendency is that these factors change slowly and are difficult to reform, at 
least intentionally.  
The political balance of power in a society is presumed by the literature to be decisive for the 
degree of judicial independence. When an alternation in power is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future, due to a dominant political party or coalition of parties, actions by the courts to 
actually hold political power accountable are more likely to cause the government to take 
control of the judiciary and thus limit their independence by changing the formal framework. 
If the judges become aware of their vulnerability, that might lead them to exercise self-
censorship. However, if the political arena is limited, or even closed, for oppositional parties, 
political actors may turn to the courts instead. This can cause an increased case load and thus 
enhance courts’ opportunity to decide cases that makes the courts politically relevant. If there 
are no alternative means to influence political power or if there is a weak civil society, the 
judiciary may be instilled with a sense of urgency and duty (Gloppen et al., 2010: 24). The 
political context can influence the opportunity structure of judges, and thus their ability and 
willingness to act independent and exercise an accountability function. If the balance of 
power goes in the direction of a dominant ruling party, this can cause changes in the formal 
framework of courts, thus weakening judicial authority and independence (Gloppen, 2004: 
169).  
The legal culture in a society is considered to be important, and the questions included here 
concerns the extent to which a culture of legalism in general permeates a society – or how the 
political community leads citizens to bring cases to the courts and other state institutions, and 
authorities to respect their rulings. Several explanations focus on the nature of the legal and 
corporate culture in a society (Gloppen et al., 2010: 24). Rosenn (1987: 33) refers to the 
difference between two broad legal traditions: common law and civil law tradition.  It is 
assumed that civil law heritage is less conducive to judicial independence than the system of 
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common law (Rosenn, 1987: 33)
10
, but in the case of Hungary, which has a civil law tradition, 
this is not so relevant. This is firstly because of the use of a civil law tradition does not, in 
itself, preclude an active role for the judiciary (Gloppen et al., 2010: 172), but also because 
this study focuses more on the extent to which the judiciary are willing to actualize the 
judicial independence.  
Furthermore, Widner (1999: 184-185) emphasizes the importance of protective constituencies 
that can make it costly for the government to encroach on the courts’ independence as an 
underlying variable that can influence the extent to which courts are able and willing to say no 
in the required situations in a “hostile” political environment. Such protective constituencies 
can be based on the support from more limited, but still politically significant groups, such as 
religious, business or international donors, or even an active civil society. By building 
constituencies, the judicial independence can be “locked in” by creating popular opinion that 
can function as a bulwark against interference from other state actors. The constituencies 
encourage and inspire, as well as support the judiciaries in the media and in the public. Some 
even quietly lobby on behalf of the judicial officers and the judiciary in general. The 
European Union functions as a protective constituency in the case of Hungary, and has the 
ability to close infringement procedures on the Hungarian government if EU law is violated.  
3.3.4 A Combined Explanation of Judicial Behavior 
Each of the approaches mentioned in this chapter provide us with important insights, but, 
when trying to explain variations in judicial independence, none of them can alone offer a 
satisfactory explanation. When considered individually, the existing explanations are both 
incomplete and overambitious. The approaches are all dominated by a monocausal nature, 
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 Unlike common law systems, the judge has historically been a weak figure in the civil law 
tradition, and the tendency is that judges within this tradition traditionally don’t have the same 
power, prestige and deference enjoyed by judges in common law traditions (Gloppen et al., 
2010: 23-24). In systems of civil law, judges are framed as technocratic appliers of legal 
codes, rather than independent actors that develop the law to serve new contexts and function 
as the core of the system, as judges in common law tradition is known for (Gloppen et al., 
2010: 172). It must be added that the separation between the two legal traditions, as well as 
their conduciveness to promote or weaken judicial independence, is debated and criticized: 
there are cases with a civil law tradition in which the judicial authority is strong and well-
developed, despite the fact that this system traditionally has been assumed to work against the 
development of judicial independence and a strong accountability function. Furthermore, 
while there traditionally have been little, or even no, use of precedent in civil law countries, 
this has now changed. The degree of precedent has increased, and there is a lot of movement 
in the distinction between the two traditions – something that indicates that the differences 
between the two legal traditions no longer can defend why some courts appear to be more 
independent than others  
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something that causes them to fall short when it comes to explaining judicial behavior. 
Gloppen et al. (2010) suggest focusing on a combination of different types of factors in order 
to gain a more complete understanding of different outcomes within the legal institution. An 
analytical framework that includes all the factors mentioned above, from the formal 
framework that provide the protection of judicial independence through procedures for 
appointment and tenure, and the formal regulation of the courts’ jurisdiction;  the corporate 
culture that guides judges in their work; and the political context of a society can offer a more 
complete explanation of judicial behavior (Gloppen et al., 2010: 29), and can help to explain 
the development of the Hungarian judiciary.  
3.3.5 The Pendulum Effect 
If the manifest judicial independence is high, there is increased likelihood that political 
authorities will attempt to reign in the judiciary through reforms limiting their formal 
authority and/or independence. Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009) argue that a strong and 
powerful court can be perceived as threatening to other political institutions, thereby initiating 
reforms that aim to undermine the court. The result is a kind of pendulum effect, where the 
courts will be held back if their independence is of such a nature that they can exercise 
considerable power at the expense of the other institutions. The theory of the pendulum effect 
can be seen in relation to the theory of the social and political context mentioned before, 
which focuses on the political balance of power in the society. If the political arena is 
occupied by a dominant political party, with limited chances for alternation in power in the 
foreseeable future, then actions by the court to hold the politicians accountable are more 
exposed to the threat of reform and measures aimed at weakening the judiciary and limiting 
their independence.  
There is a genuine fear among other political institutions that a strong court has too much 
latitude to exercise power and make decisions at the expense of other institutions – and they 
therefore implement measures that aim to limit the court’s power to act independently of the 
other institutions and undermine the structural factors that were aimed to strengthen the court 
in the first place. The court’s independence is thereby weakened, and the pendulum swings 
from a strong and independent judiciary to a weaker legal institution that is, to a much greater 
extent than before, vulnerable and exposed to abuse from other institutions. Garoupa and 
Ginsburg (2009) therefore claim that if courts become too strong and powerful, there is an 
increased risk of decline in, and loss of, courts’ independence. The opposite is the case if the 
court is too weak. A key element in any democracy is that the court has enough power to 
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perform the expected tasks. Thus, measures with an aim to improve the court’s authority and 
independence will be implemented by other institutions. Likewise, the political executive 
power, which initially launched reforms that were aimed at weakening a strong court, can 
attempt to strengthen the court, in order to use the court’s power to their advantage – as well 
as to avoid incentives that can be found in the system (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009). 
3.3.6 Institutional Change 
Institutional change can happen both gradually and suddenly. In the case of Hungary, both are 
relevant to include. Changes in the judicial institution have partly developed throughout time, 
but the process is also characterized by several rounds of sudden shocks. While gradual 
changes usually are internal, abrupt changes are often the result of discontinuous external 
events. Abrupt transformations of institutions are usually caused by revolutionary events, and 
the outcome if often consequential for state organization. Exogenous and stochastic events 
can give power to certain groups in the society who take advantage of the situation and push 
for change (Roland, 2004: 115-116). Gradual changes are not as dramatic as abrupt 
transformation, but they can be equally consequential as causes for other outcomes, as well as 
for shaping substantive political outcomes. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that gradual 
institutional change occurs when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up 
space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways. When identifying and explaining 
types of institutional change, it is necessary to focus on both the political context and 
characteristics of the institution in question – and how these two factors drive the type of 
institutional change one can expect. The characteristics of both the political context and the 
institutional form have these effects because they shape the type of dominant change agent 
that is likely to emerge in any specific institutional context – and the kinds of strategies this 
agent is likely to pursue in order to effect change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 14-15). 
Furthermore, Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that institutional change, rather than abrupt and 
discontinuous, result from an accumulation of more gradual and incremental change. 
Moreover, rather than being a result of exogenous shocks, or actions from outside of the 
system, change is often endogenous and generated from within the system, and, in some 
cases, produced by the very behavior an institution itself generates.
11
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 Streeck and Thelen (2005: 15-31) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16-18) suggest five broad modes of 
gradual change: displacement (existing rules are removed, and new ones introduced), layering (new rules are 
introduced on top of, or alongside, existing ones), drift (existing rules changes due to shifts in external 
conditions) and conversion (existing rules remain formally the same, but their impact changes due to changed 
external conditions).  
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 Table 1: A Summary of the Theoretical Framework 
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Resources 
(salaries and 
perks) 
 
Procedures for 
Promoting, 
Disciplining 
and Removing 
Judges 
 
 
39 
 
CHAPTER 4 - Empirical Analysis 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis that can contribute to a broader understanding of 
how the Hungarian judiciary has developed since the fall of communism in 1989. The chapter 
further seeks to examine the judicial independence of the judiciary in Hungary, and analyze 
how this function has developed and changed throughout the years. The aim of the chapter is 
to provide an accurate review of the historic development of the Hungarian judiciary, which 
then again can help to explain why and how judicial independence in Hungary has developed. 
The understanding of the organization and development of the judiciary, and their actions, are 
built on answers given through interviews, as well as other empirical sources, and the 
descriptions and analysis in the following chapter is built on the theoretical framework that 
was introduced in the previous chapter. The chapter addresses both the Constitutional Court 
and the ordinary judiciary, but it must be stressed that the two institutions are institutionally 
separated. The two institutions are led by separated administrative units, and their tasks are 
tactfully coordinated so that the different areas of focus aren’t overstepped.  
4.1 The Beginning: Dealing with the Past and Moving into the Present 
The history of Hungary has played a major role in its present, and can contribute to a greater 
understanding of the Hungarian case. Even though Hungary enjoyed independence for 
centuries in the early beginning of the country, the experience of foreign domination over the 
last centuries is an important and defining feature of the consciousness of the Hungarian 
public. The Ottoman Empire took control over Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Habsburgs followed in the eighteenth, nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries – and the Soviet Union from 1945 and until the communist regime fell in 
1989. Foreign domination over centuries required techniques of survival and informal 
operation, and the Hungarians learned to operate in such a way that they mastered the formal 
and rigid rules that represented the dominant foreign power  (Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 204). 
Even though Hungary’s triumphs and defeats throughout history have turned out to be a 
complicated legacy for the rulers of both the communist and the post-communist system, the 
country’s transition out of communism in 1989, when the fall of communism brought with it 
major changes for Eastern Europe, proved to be a particular smooth one. The Hungarian 
government at the time, already one of the most liberal of the communist governments, 
allowed free association and assembly and ordered the opening of the country’s border with 
the West – something that provided an avenue that the ever-increasing number of East 
Germans could use as an escape route (Argentieri, 2008: 215-216). The Hungarian transition 
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to democracy was characterized by non-violence and round-table talks between the 
communist power holders and the emerging opposition organizations. This was possible as a 
result of a shared agreement among the elites that legal security had to be put before justice, 
and when upholding this procedural legal continuity, the negotiating parties managed to avoid 
continuity with the communist dictatorship regarding their content. In order to unify their 
strength, the opposition parties decided to form an Opposition Round Table in March 1989. 
Three parties participated in these talks: the Communist Party (MSZMP), the Opposition 
Round Table (EKA, with nine oppositional organizations), and the so-called Third Side 
(seven organizations), which were invited by the MSZMP, as satellite organizations of them. 
Though, the real discussion took place between the MSZMP and EKA, while the Third Side 
basically just accepted the compromise they presented (Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 208-209).  
The trilateral discussions of the National Round Table Talks, occurring mostly in the summer 
of 1989, were a series of formalized, orderly and highly legalistic discussions held in 
Budapest that resulted in a change of the constitution and the declaration of the democratic 
Republic on 23 October 1989. Importantly, it meant the loss of communist control. This was 
followed by a national referendum on 26 November 1989 that settled unresolved issues, such 
as the status of the president and the accounting for communist wealth, and a parliamentary 
election in March-April 1990, in which the center-right MDF “Hungarian Democratic 
Forum”, whose leader, József Antall, became the first democratically elected prime minister, 
that ended the transition (Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 209). A great contribution to the success 
of the peaceful and coordinated transition was a split within the communist party between the 
reformers and the hardline representatives of the old guard, and when analyzing the 
Hungarian case, it needs to be stressed that no true hardliners were represented in the National 
Round Table Talks, since they had already been marginalized before the talks even began 
(Bozóki and Simon, 2010: 209).  
4.1.1 Building a New Constitutional Structure: a Road to the Rule of Law 
The democratic transition altered the basic structures of the Hungarian State, and the early 
1990s were therefore characterized by a focus on establishing democratic institutions and 
formal guidelines for the new regime. There was no rule of law in Eastern Europe during the 
communist years, and the first reaction when communism fell was that it was necessary to 
reject all communist structures. There was a complete agreement that fundamental human 
rights needed to be protected, although there was both ignorance and uncertainty about the 
means of achieving this. Even though communism was dead, the ideology’s ideas, patterns of 
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behavior and institutions still penetrated the society, although with varying degrees in the 
Eastern European countries. Systems of checks and balances were often rudimentary, courts 
and judges lacked the self-esteem necessary to develop judicial independence and while the 
Western models of the rule of law were the models they strived to reach, the models were 
applied out of context (Sajó, 1995: 253-254). The new constitutional Court, as well as the 
reestablishment of the ordinary judiciary, must be seen in this context.  
The year of 1989 marked a new era for Hungary, and introduced the concept of constitutional 
democracy. Like the other countries in the region, the outcome of the political transition was 
revolutionary: democratic institutions replaced an authoritarian regime, and the dominating 
communist ideology was replaced by a pluralist society. Though, compared to the rapid 
political transformation, the text of the Hungarian constitution was changed only gradually. 
When establishing a new and democratic regime in 1989-1990, it was decided to only amend 
the provisions of the old Stalinist-era constitution of 1949 in order to preserve the concept of 
constitutional continuation (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 241), instead of adopting a new one. These 
amendments created a legal framework
12
 that laid the foundation for the new democratic 
Hungary: representative government, a parliamentary system, an independent judiciary, 
ombudsmen that could guard important and fundamental rights, and a Constitutional Court 
that had the capacity to review the laws for their constitutionality (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 
183-184). The constitution was further amended after the elections of 1990, with a shared 
understanding that these amendments would be followed by a complete constitutional 
overhaul when the time was right. Though, by the early 1990s, the constitution had been 
revised so many times that it only in its formal framework remained the same as the 
communist 1949 constitution, meaning that basically every provision of the old communist 
constitution was changed in the Constitution of 1989. Substantively there was a clear break 
with the communist constitution of 1949 (Fröhlich and Csink, 2012: 425). This resulted in a 
somewhat humorous, yet true (according to some), statement claiming that “the only 
provision remaining from the old constitution was a statement reaffirming that Budapest was 
the capital of Hungary” (Dimitrijevic 2013 [interview]).  
The judiciary was formally independent during the communist years, but judges were under 
strict supervision and direction by the communist rule (Csink 2013 [interview]), and that was 
a legacy of the past which proved difficult to get rid of after the political transition (Tóth, B 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the 1989 Constitution,  
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2013 [interview]).  As in other post-dictatorial Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, 
Hungarians found it difficult to trust that an autocratic and politically compromised judiciary, 
trained under communism, could safeguard the constitutional liberties and human rights (Sajó, 
1995: 253). The distrust of judges of the communist party-state and political mistrust between 
the negotiating parties during the transition period (Szente, 2013: 1594) caused consensus 
among the participants in the Round Table Talks that there was a need for an active institution 
with wide-ranging responsibilities that could contribute to the establishment of legal and 
democratic traditions. “At the time of the transition in 1989 was undisputed that there was a 
need to have an institution that could secure judicial review. This institution should be kept 
separated from the ordinary judiciary” (Kovács 2013 [interview]). The Constitutional Court, 
based on the German model, was therefore established in October 1989, and despite 
discussions concerning the necessity of such an institution, as several democracies all over the 
world functioned perfectly well without one, a majority of the participants involved in the 
Round Table Talks of 1989 agreed that such an institution, separated from the ordinary 
judiciary, was needed as a safeguard of fundamental rights and to administer and usher 
constitutional transformation (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 184). Furthermore, as the early 1990s 
were the beginning of a new era in Hungary, there were no established institutions that could 
promote the new democratic state governed by the rule of law or protect fundamental human 
rights. It therefore became apparent that the Constitutional Court could play a potentially 
important role in the Hungarian society (Uitz, 2013: 1-4). While the institution’s organization 
and authority had been determined by the trilateral political negotiations, together with the 
subject of political transformation of the political system, the basic provisions of the 
Constitutional Court was first established in October 1989, in the Act on the Constitutional 
Court. The first five judges of the Court were elected by the Parliament on 23 November 
1989, and commenced their operation on 1 January 1990. Furthermore, five additional 
members were elected by the new and freely elected Parliament in mid-1990s (The 
Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2014). The Basic Law of Hungary
13
, from 2012, further 
increased the number of judges from eleven to fifteen (The Constitutional Court of Hungary, 
2014).  
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 See paragraph 4.2.2  
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Figure 1:  The Composition of the Constitutional Court of Hungary 
 
(The Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2014) 
4.1.2 Powers and Actions of the Hungarian Court 
The Constitutional Court played an active and important role in the early 1990s, when they 
acted as an interpreter of the Hungarian legal framework and the constitution. “In the first 
period of the 1990s, the Court played an important role in establishing the rule of law as a 
system in Hungary” (Fleck 2013 [interview]). After its establishment in 1989, the Court 
commenced its operation with interpreting the temporary or transitional constitution, waiting 
for the final constitution that was promised in the preamble of the document from 1989. As 
the necessary parliamentary majority was absent during 1990 and 1994, and the political 
parties fought against each other, there was never a question of adopting a new constitution. It 
therefore became the duty of the newly established Court to interpret the provisions of the 
constitution that had been modified at its core in 1989, but which should rather be classified 
as an extension of the 1949 constitution, based on its structure. The court, led by its president 
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at the time, László Sólyom,
14
 became an institution that defined the constitutional rules, and 
with its decisions of definitive significance the Court became the gatekeeper of the transition. 
The focus of the Court was to work out real constitutional legal doctrines by interpreting the 
Constitution from an expanded viewpoint stemming from their judicial activism. That led to 
decisions in questions of determinative significance, such as the right to life, abolition of the 
death penalty, and compensation regarding retrospective actions (Csink et al., 2012: 37). The 
Constitution was regarded as a holistic unity of principles and rules, and this approach paved 
the way for the well-known, though much-criticized concept of “the invisible constitution” 
(Uitz, 2013: 6) that emerged in a dissenting opinion of Sólyom, the first president of the 
Court. According to this theory, the invisible constitution embraces and gathers all the 
background or underlying principles that are necessary in order to understand the actual 
written constitution, and it furthermore makes a coherent body of the constitutional law 
(Szente, 2013: 1596). Sólyom intended to base the decisions of the Court on both the invisible 
and the written constitution, as he saw that the general principles of constitutionalism wasn’t 
necessarily present in the written one, but they would still be observed. Between 1990 and 
1994, the Court played a strong role in working out the essential content of basic rights, and 
acted as a constitution-making power through the abstract interpretations of the Constitution 
through the decisions they made (Csink et al., 2012: 37).  The Court’s broad jurisprudence on 
transitional justice, welfare reform and capital punishment gave the Court an excellent 
international reputation (Uitz, 2013: 8), and the Constitutional Court of Hungary was, “at one 
point, the most powerful court in the world” (Dimitrijevic 2013 [interview]), “with an 
important and undisputed place in the state organization” (Csink 2013 [interview]).  
The rapidly achieved reputation as one of the most activist constitutional courts in Europe, a 
label that came under the presidency of László Sólyom, came mainly as a result of a broad 
competence that the Constitutional Court of Hungary was given from its very beginning. 
These powers were broader than in any other country with a similar institution, but it was 
argued that such broad competences were necessary in order to have the ability to block all 
attempts to restore a non-democratic system (Károlyi 2013 [interview]). Under the 1989 
constitution, the Constitutional Court had a competence of abstract review of legal rules – a 
competence that could be applied even when there was no case or controversy. The original 
design entitled anyone to bring an action or to request the review of legislation without 
limitation (Uitz, 2013: 8). There were no deadlines to be observed, and there were no 
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 The President of the HCC from 1990 to 1998. Later the President of the Republic (2005-2010) 
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requirements for the applicant to prove any personal impact or other legally protected interest. 
This competence was called Actio Popularis, and in the  two first decades, the great majority 
of the court’s proceedings fell in this category (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 185). “What made the 
Court so strong in the beginning were its competences, and especially the Actio Popularis” 
(Fröhlich 2013 [interview]), which was “a contributing factor in making the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary the most powerful court in the world” (Polgari 2013 [interview]). The fact 
that everyone could start proceedings against a norm or a rule, with no controversy, personal 
involvement with or legal interest in the law required, made the court stronger. This very 
peculiar instrument resulted in a practically unlimited access to constitutional justice in 
Hungary until few years ago. Though, it also caused a heavy burden of cases for the Court, 
and as the number of cases increased, it became difficult for the Court to conduct a thorough 
enough work (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]).  
4.1.3 Building a Legal State: the Act of 1990 
 
“The crucial point for the judicial institution is the political transition of 1989, when measures 
aiming to ensure both personal and functional independence was implemented.”  
(Csink 2013 [interview]) 
The political transition in 1989 had great consequences for the Hungarian state, and brought 
with it major changes for most of the already existing institutions. The ordinary judiciary 
system was recreated in the aftermath of the breakdown of communism, and the transition 
period in 1989-90 created the basis of the rule of law in Hungary, and gave rise to both a 
gradually evolving reform in jurisdiction and the outlines of the existing system (The Curia of 
Hungary, 2014). Though, first and foremost, it was the years for the foundation of the legal 
state (Juhász 2013 [interview]). During the communist period, the judiciary and the executive 
were closely interwoven, as in true conformity with the socialist state model. It is important to 
be familiar with this former structure of judicial administration in order to understand the 
significance of the judicial reforms (The Curia of Hungary, 2014).  
The judiciary was formally independent during state-socialism, and it was rather rare that 
judge’s decisions were ordered, and influenced, by the communist party. There were of course 
cases of political importance where the party pressure appeared, but that was rather unusual 
(Fleck 2013 [interview]). The apparent independence of the judiciary was explained as a 
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result of the political regime under Communist Party Secretary General Janos Kadar, which 
was milder than in most other communist countries. In the last two decades of the socialist 
state, the Hungarian judiciary and the courts was seldom employed as a means of open 
political repression (Sajó, 1993: 293). Judges’ independence was therefore rarely threatened, 
and they maintained a relatively high level of independence and autonomy. Though, like other 
institutions under communism, the judges were still strictly controlled by the communist 
power holders (Csink 2013 [interview]), and some political pressure was exerted as far as 
support of the ruling elite privileges, judge selection, protection of the ruling elite’s private 
interests and state interest protection. The transition in 1989 was therefore characterized by 
deep mistrust of the masses in the judiciary, as judges were considered to have been the 
means of the previous oppression (Sajó, 1993: 293-299).  However, one should not 
exaggerate the role of, and the relevance of, the judiciary in the communist system. The 
political power was unified and in the hands of the communist party, and the judiciary and the 
judges played a less central role in the first place (Fleck 2013 [interview]). The judiciary had 
little impact on a great number of social relations under the rules of procedure, and judicial 
review of administrative decisions was very unusual. The courts were considered to be 
responsible for “socialist legality” alone, and the judiciary was concerned neither with the rule 
of law or the constitutionality of legal acts and rules. Consequently the judiciary was never 
regarded as important for the power holders and the society in general. This was reflected in 
the professional prestige of the judges, and the remuneration. Due to insufficiently wages and 
too much bureaucracy in the work itself, there existed a constant shortage of judges (Sajó, 
1993: 294).  
As a result of the democratic transformation of the political system, the functioning of the 
ordinary judiciary in Hungary underwent a reform with historical consequences in the course 
of the subsequent decade. The judiciary was established as an independent branch next to the 
executive, and a formal, and very necessary, requirement of judicial independence was 
formulated through regulations and provisions in order to make the judiciary compatible with 
democracy. The goal was to activate the judiciary, which was perceived as rather passive 
before the democratization process began in 1989, for a mental change (Fleck 2013 
[interview]). A formal framework that could provide judges with the ability to act 
independent was established as a consequence of reforms aiming at strengthening what had 
during communism been a weak judiciary.  
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The transition was peaceful, and none of the judicial organizations dating from the communist 
period was terminated. However, no new organizations were created either, and judges who 
had served during the old system weren’t removed (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). Only a 
minor portion of the judiciary was replaced after the transition in 1989. This was related to 
three facts. First, only a few of the judges who were responsible for the political justice in the 
aftermath of the 1956-58 revolutionary periods were still active. They had become older, and 
many of them asked to retire (Sajó, 1993: 294). “There had been a generation shift in the 
judiciary, and the judges who served in the 1950s, and decided in the so-called political cases 
in the aftermath of the Hungarian uprisings in 1956, had retired, so that was never a problem. 
This can be considered a fortunate coincidence” (Juhász 2013 [interview]). Second, the 
judiciary leaders who were responsible for court personnel matters adapted to the emerging 
new regime in a very short time. Formal political independence for judges was granted by the 
Parliament after the regime change in 1989 in a legal framework that included a conflict of 
interest rule that prohibited judges from being members in political parties. The existing 
hierarchy was therefore saved, and the court presidents maintained their role and place in the 
system, despite former affiliation with the communist party. Third, as there was both a 
considerable lack of manpower and new functions related to work load, there existed a 
constant need for judges. A sudden increase in crime in the transition period resulted in an 
increased need for judges due to the work load  (Sajó, 1993: 294-295).  
By the early 1990s, the entire legal system was renewed, and as the right to turn to the court 
became general, it became necessary to increase the number of staff. New and younger judges 
were therefore appointed, and legislative actions renewed the content of old political decisions 
of the court (Juhász 2013 [interview]). Step by step, the Hungarian judicial system started to 
assimilate to the classical Western European judiciary. It became part of the courts’ functions 
to support the political power, be in control of crime, safeguard business and economic 
relations in the Weberian sense and of course, promoting the rule of law, especially in the 
form of judicial review (Sajó, 1993: 293). A formal framework for judicial independence was 
established, and the corporate culture was characterized by judges who had a better 
understanding of what their role should be in a democratic system, and thus were more 
willing than before to act in an independent manner.
15
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4.1.4 Organizational Transformation of the Legal Status: the Act of 1997  
In the mid-1990s, it became evident that there was a need for a general renewal of the judicial 
system. While the focus of the early 90s was to establish and formulate a requirement of 
judicial independence, the judicial and executive branch were, in close conformity with the 
socialist model, still closely interwoven. The control and administration of both county and 
local courts fell under the competence of the Minister of Justice, who further ensured, apart 
from the Supreme Court, whose president was elected by Parliament, the connection between 
the judicial and executive branch in the case of all other courts. Furthermore, the Minister of 
Justice continuously examined and guided the professional judicial activity of all courts as 
well, within the framework of its right to supervise the functioning of courts (The Curia of 
Hungary, 2014). The Minister of Justice was both responsible for, and in charge of, the 
organizational conditions and rules of the judiciary (Juhász, 2013, interview), and the 
administration of courts. That meant that the executive branch, represented by the Minister of 
Justice, lead the nomination process of judges and was in charge of budgetary issues, as well 
as the development of the budget itself (Csink 2013 [interview]).  
The judicial reform package of 1997 was introduced with an aim to remodel and reorganize 
the judicial system, and to establish a modern and more effective system which was more 
compatible with Western European standards. In order to separate the judicial and the 
executive branch, the administration of the courts was transmitted from the Minister of Justice 
to the newly established National Council of Justice
16
 (The Curia of Hungary, 2014), a self-
governing body which were entrusted with the administration of courts (Tóth, A 2013 
[interview]). “All rights regarding the administration of courts were transferred to this 
council, which was independent of all the other branches” (Vitvindics 2013 [interview]). With 
the establishment of the National Council of Justice, the judicial independence was further 
strengthened, and the control of the government was brought to an end. The external 
administration and control that had previously been exercised by the Ministry of Justice was 
transformed into an internal administration (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). The majority of the 
NCJ’s fifteen members were judges, but also other branches were represented in the council, 
such as parliamentary deputies, the general prosecutor, the head of the Hungarian bar 
association and the Minister of Justice. The president of the Supreme Court acted as the head 
of the NCJ. The Minister could only act as a member of the NCJ and had, like the rest of the 
council, one vote. The NCJ was given the right to decide on three issues: personal issues, such 
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as nominations and appointments, economical issues, like the budget of the courts, and 
administrative issues. The rights and the decisions belonged to the NCJ as a whole, not the 
head of the NCJ (Csink 2013 [interview]).  
While the tendency during communism was that judges were recruited from poor quality law 
school students, and appointed at a very early age without proper preparation (Sajó, 1993: 
294), the Act of 1997 prescribed stricter requirements that had to be met in order to become a 
judge. The Act defined exhaustively the rights and duties of judges, and established new 
principles on which to base the remuneration of judges. The aim of the law was to improve 
the composition of the judiciary, as to increase the prestige of judicial career. It further 
regulated the remuneration of judicial employees, as they were seen as an important factor 
that could increase the efficiency of the courts and their ability to act independent of other 
branches (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). Furthermore, while the judicial system until 1997 
had consisted of three levels, with local courts, county courts and the Supreme Court, which 
functioned as a court of appeal (Senyei 2013 [interview]), the reform resulted in a 
complementary fourth level. In order to reduce the workload of local courts, extend the 
possibility of legal remedy, and simultaneously reduce the number of cases and hearings for 
the Supreme Court, five regional appellate courts were established. This made it possible for 
the Court to concentrate on providing theoretical guidance to lower courts, which was their 
primary task (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). Though, it must be added that while both the 
Constitution and the Act of 1997 provided the establishment of regional courts of appeal, the 
setting up of the courts of appeal was postponed by the Parliament until 1998. That lead to the 
repeal of the relevant act of 1997, and stressed the importance of strengthening the position of 
the lower forums of jurisdiction instead (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). The parliament failed 
to regulate the establishment of several courts of appeal, notwithstanding the explicit 
approval. However, when the parliament was called upon to perform its obligation to regulate 
according to the constitution, the amendment was passed by the end of 2002. The appellate 
regional courts have been working actively since 2005, which was when the two last courts 
were instituted. With the formulation of the regional appellate courts, the establishment of a 
system with rulings about a unified application of the law and a review of court’s decisions 
was a fact (Senyei 2013 [interview]).  
 
 
50 
 
4.1.5 Consequences of Judicial Dysfunctions  
  
“There were some serious problems with the Council’s efficiency”  
(Fleck 2013 [interview]) 
The judicial council model made an end to the problems that arose in the aftermath of the 
transition in 1989. The Act of 1997, which introduced the model, declared the independence 
of judges by prohibiting them, by law, from being members of political parties. It further 
established application procedures for the nomination of judges, legislation concerning the 
appointment and remuneration of judges, and regulated the jurisdiction of the judiciary. When 
formalized by law, these legislations functioned as a guarantee of the independence of judges 
(Vitvindics 2013 [interview]), and it laid the foundation for increased interference where it 
was expected of them. The model was unique in Europe, with its structure and new 
responsibilities. Though, with new responsibilities came higher expectations. The council was 
responsible for all administrative issues, and met once every month. While the system of 
administration of justice that was introduced in 1997 was unmodified until the early 2010s, it 
had often met criticism from both scholars and politicians. As experience was gathered, there 
were concerns and questions about the efficiency of the Council (The Curia of Hungary, 
2014). “There were problems with the NCJ’s efficiency, transparency and degree of judicial 
independence. The administrative process wasn’t transparent enough” (Fleck 2013 
[interview]). As the NCJ, which took all decisions regarding the administration of courts, only 
met once a month, concerns were formulated that the NCJ couldn’t react effectively enough 
(Vitvindics 2013 [interview]). Furthermore, it had been established that the members of the 
NCJ were usually judicial leaders, such as the head of county courts, over whom the 
employer’s rights were exercised by the NCJ itself (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). As the 
NCJ’s responsibility was to overview the administrative work of the courts, and their 
presidents, that meant that the judges in the NCJ acted as a supervisory body for themselves, 
and also had to make decisions regarding their own judicial activity. As the regional courts 
saw a chance to promote their region, as well as their court, in for instance budgetary issues, 
they aimed at getting their judges into the council. This caused critical voices to claim that the 
system worked to serve and promote the courts, as well as the courts’ interests, and further 
made it easier for the members of the NCJ to favor their own regional court in vote callings 
and negotiations in order to be reelected again (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]).  
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A second issue with the system was the fact that the President of the Council was the 
President of the Supreme Court at the same time. Difficulties arose as both positions required 
full-time commitment, which made it difficult to balance the administrative tasks that came 
with the presidency of the Council and the professional judicial responsibilities of the 
President of the Supreme Court. The President of the NCJ led the office of the NCJ, but was 
obligated to fulfil the duties of internal administration at the Supreme Court, as well as the 
responsibilities that arose from the constitutional duty to establish and maintain a unity of 
jurisdiction (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). Furthermore, as the number of cases increased in 
the aftermath of the system change in 1997, so did the expectations that the NCJ would handle 
the amount of cases. Though, the NCJ, as the institution responsible for the central 
administration of courts, had difficulties coping with both the huge number of delayed cases 
and the uneven distribution of cases among the courts (The Curia of Hungary, 2014). When 
appeal became available in the 1990s, the amount of cases increased further. That caused an 
even more uneven distribution of cases, and resulted in a heavy workload for courts situated 
in Budapest and surrounding areas (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]).  
4.2 Developments since 2010: A New Constitution and a Storm of Constitutional 
Amendments 
The Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary have both played an important role in the 
Hungarian society since the transition to democracy in 1989. At the time of the transition it 
was undisputed that there was a need to have an institution, separated from the ordinary 
judiciary, which could secure judicial review. There was very little trust in the ordinary 
judiciary’s capacity to function as an institution with the responsibility of judicial review, and 
as the participants in the Round Table Talks of 1989 agreed that the German constitutional 
system was a well-functioning system, it was decided to establish a Constitutional Court 
based on this model (Kovács 2013 [interview]). The Constitutional Court was given the task 
to safeguard the fundamental rights, and function as an institutional guarantee of the 
separation of powers. These responsibilities were closely focused on all throughout the 1990s, 
and the Court played an important role in the Hungarian society in building democratic 
traditions and institution. Though, the role of the Court has recently changed, and their role 
today is allocated to a minimum, with reduced competences. It is insinuated that the changed 
role of the Court can be seen in the context of a flexible Constitution and a hostile political 
climate. Furthermore, the ordinary judicial system, which was reformed in 1997 in order to 
establish institutional guarantees of judicial independence, was completely and radically 
reorganized in 2012. The changes that this reform brought with it have met both criticism and 
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optimism. What is common for both institutions is that most changes were introduced after 
the year of 2010, which is when Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party won the 
majority of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament for the first time.  
4.2.1 The Amendment Rule: A Slippery Slope?  
 
“The opinion of the majority is that with a two-thirds majority, the government is free 
to do almost whatever they want, and change everything they want. It is the magic 
two-thirds majority. With a two-thirds majority, everything is possible. Today the 
government has a two-thirds majority. Unfortunately.”  
(Tóth, B 2013 [interview])  
During the transition away from the communist regime in 1989 and 1990, the constitutional 
drafters at the Round Table Talks were worried about two things: a fractured parliament in 
which it would be impossible for small parties to form stable majoritarian coalitions, and a 
deeply rooted constitution that would be difficult to change if the new democrats figured out 
that they wanted to change and redesign the political institutions in the country. The solution 
was to opt for an election law that favored large parties by effectively using extra seat bonuses 
as means to ensure stable governments. To allay the second concern, the amendment rule in 
the constitution opted to allow a single two-thirds majority of parliament to alter, amend or 
adopt any provision of the constitutional text (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 138). Hungarian 
parliamentarian system is therefore based on the two-thirds supermajority. Important 
regulations, such as the act on the Constitutional Court and the Constitution, can be adopted 
and amended with only a two-thirds majority (Szántho 2013 [interview]). Compared to the 
constitutions of other European states, the Hungarian constitution is therefore rather easy to 
amend. It only requires the votes of two-thirds of members of parliament in order to amend 
the constitution, and the Constitution does not render any principle or provisions that are 
unamendable. The Constitution is regarded as relatively flexible rather than rigid, despite the 
fact that it cannot be modified or amended by the ordinary law-making procedure according 
to a simple majority rule. One legislative body has the sole power to change the constitutional 
text, and there are no requirements for referendums or any other form of ratification, such as 
the approval of the subsequent parliament, in order to adopt a new constitution or amend the 
existing one. The two-thirds majority of the votes of the members of the parliament can 
further, in addition to the modification of the Constitution, elect the president of the Republic, 
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the Supreme Court chief justice, the members of the Constitutional Court and the 
Ombudsman (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 184-185).  
The two-thirds amendment rule can be explained as both a theoretical consideration and a 
practical agreement between the government and the opposition during the transition period. 
It was argued that in order to have consensus regarding legal questions, the most important 
regulations should require a two-thirds majority (Szántho 2013 [interview]). The idea was 
that, in order to govern the state properly, a simple parliamentary majority wouldn’t suffice to 
reshape the constitutional architecture, which was all gone during communism, or limit 
fundamental rights. The requirement of a qualified majority can be seen as a control over the 
governing majority in power, and as a mean to protect constitutionalism in Hungary. Though, 
it can also make the constitutional balance fragile. When modernizing the constitution, wide 
cooperation between the parties in parliament and a shared commitment toward constitutional 
values are required. If these factors are absent, the Constitution can become the victim of a 
powerful governing majority (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 187). “It is a slippery slope to have 
such an easy amendment rule: it can easily be used as a tool for the governing majority to gain 
the advantage” (Kovács 2013 [interview]).  
Though, after the system change in 1989, there were no consensus among the parties, and 
none of the political actors had the possibility to amend or adopt laws and regulations 
(Szántho 2013 [interview]). Prior to 2010, there was only one period, between 1994 and 1998, 
where the government had the support of a two-thirds parliamentary majority. There were a 
number of issues in which the then-ruling Socialist-Liberal coalition government failed to 
seek the consent of the opposition regarding certain acts that required a two-thirds majority. 
Though, the governing majority expressed some willingness to cooperate with the opposition 
in constitution-making (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 187). When the possibility of writing a new 
constitution emerged in the 1990s to complete the transition, the procedural guarantees of the 
Constitution were modified with the establishment of a requirement in the Constitution that 
called for a four-fifths majority of the members in Parliament to introduce and approve the 
detailed rules on making a new constitution (Article 24(5), old Constitution)(Uitz, 2013: 11). 
The supermajority rule was designed in order to ensure that a new constitution would have 
broad political acceptance (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 249). Though, a hostile political 
environment and contradictory constitutional notions made sure that the constitution-making 
process further collapsed in 1997. The coalition had serious political differences, and as the 
ideas of rival political parties regarding the legal frameworks of the political community were 
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so diffuse, there was no consensus on a new constitution. Thus, although the Constitution of 
1989 was amended several times, the basic structure of the state under the 1989 Constitution 
remained untouched until 2010 (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 187). Furthermore, as none of the 
political parties were able to gather a two-thirds majority in parliament, regulations regarding 
the Constitutional Court remained unmodified for more than twenty years (Szántho 2013 
[interview]). 
Throughout the years the amendment rule has caused debate in Hungary. Though, there is a 
surprisingly broad consensus among most respondents participating in this study that the rule 
in itself is not the problem, despite the fact that it certainly color the political context. In a 
polarized country, such as Hungary, a two-thirds majority rule can make it easier to push 
through important political issues, and the Hungarian political context is in many ways 
created around such a majority. Most important regulations can only be adopted or amended if 
the parliament has a two-thirds majority. This is an agreement from the transitional period, 
which was meant to create consensus regarding all important legal regulations. The idea was 
that if there was a will to change or amend a regulation, then the political groupings would 
have to agree on how to reach the necessary majority and thereby create consensus (Szántho 
2013 [interview]). However, the amendment rule must be used carefully. It makes demands 
on those who use it, and the way they use it (Grabow 2013 [interview]). “The two-thirds 
majority is not a problem; it has always been like that. Though, in my opinion, in order to 
prevent a too powerful governing majority, there should be more political compromises” 
(Csink 2013 [interview]). Furthermore, such a rule imposes greater demands on other 
institution’s ability to function as checks and balances, to prevent misuse. The judiciary has a 
significant role in checking the state (Polgár 2013 [interview]). “The two-thirds majority is a 
part of the constitutional legacy in Hungary, but it must not cause the neglect of rights 
protection and institutional design. That is the challenge today” (Tóth, B 2013 [interview]).  
4.2.2 After the 2010 Elections 
 
“The problem today is not the requirement of a qualified majority. The problem is the party in 
position of the two-thirds majority.”  
(Grabow 2013 [interview]) 
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In the parliamentary election of 2010, the then opposition parties Fidesz, from the center-
right, and the Christian Democratic People’s Party won 263 of the 386 mandates in the 
Parliament, giving them an overwhelming majority of 68 percent of the seats with 53 percent 
of the votes,
17
 and the necessary two-thirds of the seats in parliament. According to the 
theoretical framework, there is a theoretical expectation that if an alternation in power is 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, due a dominant political party, actions by the court to 
impose judgments with political costs for the government are more likely to cause the 
government to take control of the judiciary, and thus limit their independence by changing the 
formal framework.   
The constitution-making majority Fidesz won was sufficiently large to amend the Constitution 
or rewrite it totally (Lendvai, 2012: 207), thus making constitutional revision exceptionally 
easy. It turned out that both were to happen as, just after the election results were ready, an 
immediate flow of constitutional changes and amendments took place. These changes were all 
a part of Fidesz’ plan to completely remake the Hungarian political order (Bánkuti et al., 
2012b: 238), and affected the manner of election, composition, jurisdiction and the procedure 
of the Constitutional Court. A wide range of constitutional amendments were adopted within 
the first year of Fidesz’ term, and the 1989 Constitution was adjusted ten times within six 
month (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 187-188). One year after the 2010 election a new constitution 
was promulgated, named the Basic Law – a constitution which in recent times has been 
accompanied by subsequent amendments (Uitz, 2013: 9).  
Fidesz presents their overwhelming victory in the 2010 elections
18
 as a revolution that was 
called for by the citizens, who wanted a change in the organization of the government. 
Though, the supermajority can be explained as a result of both the existing election law that 
gave Fidesz 68 percent of the seats in Parliament after having received 53 percent of the 
popular vote, and the total collapse of the primary opponents in the election, the Socialists, 
who actually had the parliamentary majority from 2002 to 2010. The last years of the Socialist 
era was characterized by economic recession and scandals within the party, and it hardly came 
as a surprise to anyone that the Socialists gained only 19 percent of the popular vote in the 
2010 election. Thus, it is difficult to interpret the landslide victory of Fidesz in 2010 as a 
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 The Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), in reality a satellite party of Fidesz, ran on a joint list with 
Fidesz. After the election on 11 and 25 April 2010 a parliamentary fraction of KDNP was formed, and the party 
became an official coalition partner of ruling party Fidesz.  
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 New Parliamentary elections were held on 6 April 2014, and as in 2010, the ruling conservative coalition i.e. 
the alliance of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) gained once again a two-thirds 
majority.  
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positive mandate for a constitutional transformation of the Hungarian society (Bánkuti et al., 
2012b: 253). In fact, Fidesz never promised constitutional changes during the election 
campaign – rather, it promised the reverse. It was denied that such changes were planned, and 
Orbán, the party’s candidate for prime minister, only promised “big changes” if he and his 
party were to win the most votes. It was a tendency in the 2010 election that many citizens 
decisively rejected the Socialist party because of the reasons mentioned above, but that is not 
necessarily the same as voting for major constitutional changes. Yet, from May 2010, when 
Fidesz took office in the Hungarian parliament, and to January 1, 2012, when the new 
Constitution went into effect, Fidesz initiated the most significant constitutional reforms since 
1990 (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 253).  
Between May 2010 and April 2011, before the enactment of a new constitution, Parliament 
passed a flow of constitutional amendments which removed and challenged key constitutional 
checks on legislation. Furthermore, a constitution-drafting process that could proceed without 
involvement from the opposition was facilitated by Fidesz. One of the constitutional 
amendments removed the provision from 1995 that required the four-fifth vote of Parliament 
to approve the rules of drafting a new constitution. The amendment removed the most 
important formal obstacle to make a new constitution, and made it easier for Fidesz to change 
the constitution without having to consult any of the opposition parties (Uitz, 2013: 11). The 
provision requiring the four-fifths majority was meant to protect the interest of minority 
parties. Though, Fidesz didn’t have the required four-fifths, so one of their first amendments 
was to use the two-thirds majority to remove the requirement to have four-fifths of the votes - 
the last restraint on a government.
19
 The amendment rule to the constitution was never altered 
to exempt the new four-fifths rule from its responsibility, so Fidesz was able to use its two-
thirds majority vote and eliminate the four-fifths requirement from the constitution. With that 
rule gone, Fidesz was free to write a new constitution without interference from any other 
parties (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 139). The removal of the requirement enabled Fidesz to revise 
the constitution without having to rely on the votes of parties outside its own parliamentary 
bloc. This change was followed by other major and crucial changes that caused difficulties for 
the opposition when trying to interfere in the constitutional revolution while it was happening 
(Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 254). Consequently, those who are critical of the new constitution have 
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 Some scholars believe that this act ceased to be in force in 1998 at the end of the parliamentary term of the 
coalition government who adopted it.  
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claimed that the new 2012 Hungarian constitution should have been adopted by four-fifths of 
the votes of the members of parliament (Fröhlich and Csink, 2012: 427).  
The Basic Law of Hungary entered into force on 1 January 2012, and made Hungary topical 
both inside and outside the country, more than two decades after the post-communist 
constitutional transition (Fröhlich and Csink, 2012: 424). The adoption of the Basic Law 
symbolized formal discontinuity, but in general, with respect to the basic content, there is 
continuity with the constitutional culture of the past twenty years since 1989 (Fröhlich and 
Csink, 2012: 425). With  a great deal of public fanfare and symbolic reasoning,
20
 the new 
Constitution was the final step in the Hungarian transition begun in 1989, completely 
replacing the constitution established at that time (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 238). The 
Constitution introduced new institutions to the legal system, and gave already established 
institutions new roles and tasks. While some scholars evaluating these institutions are critical 
about the new regulations, others are rather optimistic. Furthermore, several of the novelties 
in the new Hungarian constitution have been debated by international organizations, and 
while such interest is quite unusual for a national constitution, it must be emphasized that the 
Basic Law of Hungary does bring unusual solutions.  
4.3 Consequences for the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court was established as an institution that could act as a safeguard of 
fundamental rights, and an institutional guarantee of the separation and balance of powers in 
the Hungarian society. Since Hungary was established as a one-chamber legislature, there is 
no limiting upper house in the Hungarian constitutional system. Furthermore, because 
Hungary is a unitary state, it cannot follow the vertical separation of powers doctrine which is 
characteristic of the federalist states. Hungary is a parliamentary system, in which the 
executive and legislative branches are interwoven, and the president has strongly limited 
competences, with few veto powers. Hence, the fundamental rights that are recognized by the 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court, that are responsible for the interpretation and 
upholding of those rights, are the only real constitutional checks on the powers of the 
parliament (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 185).  
The Constitutional Court managed to stay in the limelight for two decades as an important 
institution that led the creation of a new constitutional architecture and ushered the transition 
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 The constitution was officially signed by the president of the Republic on Easter Monday, which caused it to 
be known as the “Easter Constitution.” That highlights the aspirations that are expressed in the Basic Law of 
2012 itself to make Hungary a Christian nation.  
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to democracy. Though, the Court, which was known to stand up against the other political 
branches, and had its tense moments with them over the years, has supposedly lost its strong 
position in the Hungarian society. While some explain this as a natural development in which 
the Court has fulfilled its role in building a constitutional democracy (Mázi 2013 [interview]), 
others blame Fidesz, who came sweeping into power in 2010, for making the Constitutional 
Court a subject of political power demonstration.  
However, what is undoubtedly a fact is that constitutional amendments in the Act on the 
Constitutional Court of 2011, as well as the Basic Law of 2012, brought with it great 
consequences for the Constitutional Court, and affected the formal framework in the manner 
of election, composition, jurisdiction and procedure of the Constitutional Court (Uitz, 2013: 
9). Further amendments in the aftermath of the new Constitution, such as the Fourth 
Amendment to the Basic Law, brought with it even larger consequences for the Court.  
4.3.1 Changes in the Nomination Process 
After the inauguration of the new coalition government, consisting of Fidesz and KDNP, the 
two-thirds majority was used to amend the constitution so that the constitutional regulation of 
the nomination process of the constitutional justices was changed. Hitherto, the members of 
the Constitutional Court had been nominated by a special committee consisting of one 
member of each parliamentary fraction, with one vote each, before the nomination was 
confirmed and elected by a two-thirds vote of the Parliament’s members (Kovács and Tóth, 
2011: 193). This rule was meant to enhance consensus-building in the parliament, and to 
ensure that the opposition of the day had participation rights when deciding on the most 
important constraint of majority politics (Uitz, 2013: 10). In June 2010, the procedure for 
electing the justices of the Court was changed, and under the new rule a single two-thirds 
parliamentary vote is all that is necessary. A parliamentary committee, consisting of members 
appointed from and by the parties according to their share of seats in parliament, nominates 
the justices (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 254), which basically means that it is the governing party 
that nominates the candidate (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 139). A consequence of this change is that 
there is no longer a need for consensus. The parliamentary majority has the opportunity to 
overpower its opposition, or even its own coalition partner, in the nomination committee 
(Uitz, 2013: 11). Given the composition of the parliament at the time of the change, that 
meant that Fidesz was given the opportunity to put their own candidates onto the court.
21
 
Though, the changes are justified by the government as a necessary development: the 
                                                          
21
 As a direct result of this constitutional change, the majority has nominated and elected seven new justices.  
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Hungarian system is built on an idea that all important decisions have to be taken with a two-
thirds majority in order to be implemented. However, as it is rather rare that a government 
wins two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the old solution was meant to gain consensus 
between the parties in parliament in order to appoint judges. Today the government has the 
necessary two-thirds majority, and that makes it no more than natural that the competence of 
nominating judges is decided with the two-thirds majority, like all other important decisions 
(Mázi 2013 [interview]).  
According to theory, this is an alarming development. The formal framework that provides 
judges with the ability to act independent is changed by the government, and that can cause 
changes in the practice of the judiciary. The most common measure to ensure that the 
personal independence of judges is protected and insulated from political inference is through 
the selection and reappointment processes. As executive dominance, with its two-thirds 
majority, is the central challenge in Hungary, it is especially worrying that the institutional 
rules, which should limit the executive influence over judicial appointments and strengthen 
the court’s ability to hold political power to account, are changed in a favorable direction for 
the government.  A typical assumption is that judge’s decisions are influenced by who 
appoints them, and by granting significant roles to other political, though neutral, actors in the 
process of electing justices, the judiciary is protected sufficiently from undue executive 
influence. The procedure for electing judges in Hungary is now based on a two-thirds 
majority. That is not necessarily a bad solution, but it relies heavily on those in position of 
such a majority – and their ability to appoint neutral judges with no clear political preferences. 
If the executive branch is entrusted with the task of selecting judges, without constraints, then 
the risk of selecting candidates that are unqualified increases. The theory emphasizes the 
importance of some form of legislative or judicial approval as check when selecting judges 
(Rosenn, 1987: 19-22). Though, as the composition of the committee that proposes the judges, 
and the majority required to elect them, has given the government the power to appoint and 
nominate judges without having to rely on the support of the opposition (Fröhlich 2013 
[interview]), or the approval of the legislative or judicial branch, the government can select 
judges without constraints. That undermines the independence of the Court’s members in 
relation to the current government.  
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Though, a provision in the Act on the Constitutional Court,
22
 article 3(4), prevents the 
government from appointing judges that come directly from the parliament:  
“Having been a member of Government or a leading official in any political party or 
having held a leading state officials in the four year prior to election shall disqualify 
persons from becoming Members of the Constitutional Court” 
(ACT CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, 2011) 
Still, seven new justices have been appointed so far, and just to state an example: most of 
them shared the government’s view that the challenged rules of the most controversial case23 
were in line with the constitution (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013: 16). 
Furthermore, there are no restrictions on previous members of Parliament prior to an election. 
Thus, the tendency is that most of the newly appointed justices have strong links to, or are 
directly connected to, the ruling party, and that is a possible reason for the changes in the role 
of the Constitutional Court (Polgár 2013 [interview]). Two of the judges in the Court are 
former ministers. One of them, Dr. István Balsaim, was Minister of Justice in both the 
government of József Antall, between 1990 and 1993, and the government of Péter Boross, 
between 1993 and 1994. He was later a member of the Parliament, representing Fidesz. When 
he was elected a member of the Constitutional Court in 2011, he resigned from his 
parliamentary seat and other political positions. Though, as a former Member of Parliament 
for Fidesz, it is easy to assume that his preferences and political views are located near the 
ones of Fidesz (Polgár 2013 [interview]). Furthermore, Dr. István Stumpf, a judge of the 
Constitutional Court since 2010, was a former minister in the Prime Ministerial Office from 
1998 to 2002. As both judges held their positions more than four years before they were 
elected as judges, the appointment was in line with the Act on the Constitutional Court 
(Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). Theory emphasizes the importance of avoiding conflict of 
interest in order to enhance judicial independence (Rosenn, 1987: 19-21), and to establish a 
legal framework that aims at protecting the ability of court to act independent of other 
branches of government. Hungarian judges are prohibited by law from being members of 
political parties, but as there are no rules that prohibit former MPs to enter the Court, several 
of the judges have clear connections to the governing majority. Ambiguous situations and 
conflicts can therefore easily arise. That is problematic.  
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However, there are examples of newly appointed judges, expected to act in accordance with 
the governing majority’s preferences, who have gone against the government. Judge Stumpf 
has led a professional and independent work since he was elected, and has voted against the 
government on several issues (Mázi 2013 [interview]). “Unfortunately, judge Stumpf is the 
only judge taking the liberty to go against the government in many cases. All other judges 
elected after 2010 are echoes of the government’s legal reasoning in important cases” (Sepsi 
2013 [interview]). Nevertheless, it is still problematic for the independence of the 
Constitutional Court: the justices are determining the constitutionality of laws that they might 
have voted on in parliament, or even submitted (Tóth, B 2013 [interview]), and it creates an 
attitude among most people that the Court is packed with judges loyal to the government 
(Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). “There are members in the Court who shouldn’t be there” 
(Grabow 2013 [interview]).  
The new composition of the Court has altered the corporate culture within the Hungarian 
judiciary, and thus influenced the willingness of judges to realize their potential for 
independence. The internal standards, created by the judiciary itself, that judges are 
incorporated into, are important when explaining the apparent decline in the Court’s 
independence. Furthermore, attitudinal approaches emphasized in the theoretical part of the 
thesis focuses on judge’s ideology, values and preferences – and understand judicial decisions 
as something that directly reflects the policy preferences of judges. The appointment of judges 
who have clear ties to the governing majority can be seen in relation to the work of Dahl 
(1957), which implies that the Constitutional Court serves as a pro-majoritarian institution  in 
which their judicial decisions are a function of the political preference of the judiciary. This is 
the result of the selection process in which judges who share the political preferences of the 
incumbent government are appointed.  
“The Constitutional Court lost autonomy when it was packed with selected lawyers, 
legal experts and law profiles with clear connections to Fidesz. It curtailed all the 
authority of the Constitutional Court, and turned the Court into a political body” 
(Fleck 2013 [interview]) 
“The composition of the court has large impact on the Court’s independence – much more 
than changes in its competences” (Miklosi 2013 [interview]). Several former Fidesz ministers 
and members of parliament have been appointed since the changes in the nomination process 
(Lendvai, 2012: 222), and that has shown to be an effective way of weakening the court 
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(Kovács 2013 [interview]). “The composition has weakened the Court’s function as an 
external control mechanism” (Polgari 2013 [interview]). The Liberal Party (LMP) proposed to 
amend the Act on the Constitutional Court with a provision that would disqualify former 
members of parliament from being appointed to the Constitutional Court, but the proposal 
was rejected (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). “Personally I would have supported this proposal 
very much” (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]).  
However, the composition of today’s court is a fair balance of judges elected both before and 
after 2010. It is important to mention that new and old is not the only dividing line. That is too 
simple (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]).  
4.3.2 Fiscal and Budgetary Laws  
In November 2010, a new amendment curbed and limited the jurisdiction of the Court to 
review the constitutionality of certain budgetary, tax and fiscal laws and measures (Kovács 
and Tóth, 2011: 193), unless such rules were violating certain listed rights that were hard to 
infringe with budget measures, such as human dignity, the right to life, the right to Hungarian 
citizenship, the protection of personal data or freedom of religion or belief (Uitz, 2013: 12). 
This means that, unless the petition refers to the listed rights, the Court may not examine and 
review the constitutionality of acts that are related to the state budget, central taxes, custom 
duties and laws regulating local government taxation (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 194). 
Conspicuously, the Court are in no position to review tax or budget laws if they violate other 
rights that are easier to limit with fiscal measures, such as the right to property and the 
guarantee of fair judicial procedure (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 139). The amendment was passed 
after the Constitutional Court found that a 98 percent retroactive tax, imposed on, in order to 
plug gaping budget holes, the compensation and severance payments of state servants who 
had left public employment in the preceding five years, was unconstitutional. Parliament 
responded by both amending the old constitution in such a manner that the jurisdiction of the 
Court was curbed on fiscal matters, and by rephrasing the constitutional provision on special 
taxes and reenacting the law with the 98 percent special retroactive income tax in it. The 
Court found the special tax unconstitutional again in its second decision on the matter, and 
claimed that it was violating the right to human dignity. Though, the rule that curbed the 
jurisdiction of the Court on economic legislation was still included in the Basic Law of 2012 
(Uitz, 2013: 13).  
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The restrictions of the Court’s jurisdiction to review fiscal laws changed the formal 
framework, and thus weakened the Court’s authority.24 The Court was deprived of the 
opportunity to check budgetary and tax policies – and that gave Fidesz room to present a wide 
range of unconventional economic policies, and to act in the financial arena without having to 
pay attention to the Court, who, in the original constitutional design, was supposed to function 
as a constitutional constraint (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 255). The limitations on the jurisdiction 
of the Court were designed to avoid and eliminate judicial scrutiny of the government’s 
policies. Hence, when a government policy effectively nationalized private pensions by 
establishing a penalty that those who refused to move their private pensions into public 
accounts had to pay, a prior decision of the Court was directly violated. The prior decision of 
the Court held that it was unconstitutional for the government to threaten to cut pensions if 
people chose not to move their private pension funds into state coffers, as people had property 
interests in the money they had paid into public pension funds. The policy resulted in eight-
thousand cases on the issue going to the European Court of Human Rights relating these 
controversial changes in the pension system
25
 (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 140). The new 
limitations were meant to avoid such judicial scrutiny, by effectively making the prior 
decisions of the Court unenforceable (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 255).  
However, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has emphasized that the Government will remove the 
Constitutional Court’s restrictions with regard to financial issues, once the public debt of 
Hungary sinks below 50 percent of gross domestic product (Dempsey, 2011). This is also 
stated in the Basic Law of 2012, in a constitutional amendment that was enacted on December 
30, 2011. That implies that as long as the public debt is more than 50 percent of the GDP, the 
Court can never review fiscal laws enacted during this period. Only new fiscal laws that are 
enacted after the debt drops below 50 percent of the GDP can be reviewed by the Court 
(Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 261). However, regarding the state of the Hungarian finances, this is 
something that is not expected to happen in the foreseeable future (Csink 2013 [interview]).  
By restricting the Court from reviewing budget and tax policy, the Fidesz government can act 
in the financial arena without having to pay attention to the constitutional constraints they 
would have met otherwise – and excludes the possibility of there being consequences of 
violating the constitution in those areas. “The restrictions on the Court’s competence to deal 
with financial laws are definitely a limitation. Such provisions cannot be found anywhere else 
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in the world” (Kovács 2013 [interview]). When restricting the Court’s competence in such a 
way that it can only review certain state acts with regard to only a limited part of the 
constitution, it runs counter to the aim of the most important task of the Court: enhancing the 
protection of fundamental rights in Hungary (The Venice Commission, 2013). Fundamental 
provisions of the constitution are all of a sudden not valid in cases of financial issues (Kovács 
2013 [interview]). For instance, laws that violate the right to property, which is a fundamental 
human right, cannot be reviewed by the Court, and that is questionable given Hungary’s 
communist past (Jakab 2013 [interview]).  “Restricting the Court’s competence in financial 
issues is a negative change, and, for the integrity of the constitution, especially regarding 
human rights, it is negative that there are regulations that the Court cannot review (Csink 
2013 [interview]). The selection of protected rights can further cause a conflict between the 
Hungarian legal system and the rights protected by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 195). The fact that the restriction will terminate when the 
state debts drops below 50 percent of the GDP is a poor consolation, both because there are 
insecurities regarding what the government actually includes in the GDP, and because the 
current level of state debt is almost 90 percent, which means that it is extremely unlikely that 
the state debt will drop below 50 percent in the foreseeable future (Tóth, B 2013 [interview]). 
The Venice Commission (2013) further points out that such a limitation on the Court’s power 
to review financial laws when state debt exceeds 50 percent give an impression that capping 
the national budget at 50 percent of the GDP is such an important aim that it might be reached 
by using unconstitutional laws.   
The restriction of the Court’s ability to review the constitutionality of financial measures 
caused fierce criticism, both because it gave room for the government to regulate financial 
issues without interference from the court, and because there is a genuine fear that the 
restriction can cause neglect of fundamental human rights. Though, there is support for the 
restrictions as well. The government defended the restriction by arguing that budgetary and 
tax issues rightly remain the preserve of an elected government (Navracsics, 2011). Some 
argues that the executive and legislative branch should deal with financial matters, such as the 
budget, together, without the interference of other institutions. As both branches are elected 
by the people, this can guarantee a certain degree of democratic control over the process 
(Polgár 2013 [interview]). Others claim that the powers of the Court related to fiscal 
regulations and provisions used to be too wide, and that the Court’s frequent annulments of 
the budget made it difficult for the governing majority to implement changes in the national 
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economy (Szántho 2013 [interview]). It was therefore agreed that the Court’s competences 
regarding financial and budgetary laws had to be regulated (Mázi 2013 [interview]).  
“Though, there are differences between regulating a competence in order to make it more 
compatible with the institutional design, and deliberately restricting it” (Tóth, B 2013 
[interview]).  
4.3.3 An Increase in the Number of Seats  
Finally, a constitutional amendment passed by Parliament in June 2011 affecting the 
Constitutional Court increased the number of seats on the Court from 11 to 15, effective since 
September 2011 (The Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2014), giving the government the 
power to name four additional judges, thus ensuring that the majority of judges on the Court 
were friendly faces (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 255). The government was further able to fill 
vacancies on the Court that had opened up after it took office, and Fidesz therefore named a 
total of seven of the fifteen judges on the Court in its first year and a half in office. The 
amendment strengthened Fidesz’ control over the Constitutional Court (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 
140), and with the new judges on board, Fidesz was given new and reliable votes, in addition 
to the votes that Fidesz already knew that they could count on from appointments that were 
made when prior rules guaranteed that all the major parties had representatives within the 
Court. The majority makes it highly unlikely that important provisions and elements of the 
new constitutional program will meet resistance (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 255). Changes in the 
personnel of the Court altered the corporate culture within the judiciary, and thus the 
willingness of judges to act independent. Changes in the internal standards of the Court can 
further face problems of interpretations when the corporate culture changes, and this can open 
up space for actors within the institution to implement existing rules in new ways, thus 
causing a gradual change of the Court.  
The government defended the increase in judges from 11 to 15 by claiming that it was 
necessary because of the workload of the Court, and how the workload would increase when 
introducing a new system of constitutional design (Jakab 2013 [interview]). Though, the 
argument falls short when comparing Hungary with Germany, who has a similar 
constitutional system. Germany is both larger in size and population, but the number of judges 
within the constitutional court is only 16. Furthermore, the caseload of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court is much lower today than it was just a few years back, and that makes the 
increase in the number of judges a paradox (Kovács 2013 [interview]). “The number of judges 
66 
 
was increased, so that the government would have the majority within the Court. End of 
story” (Polgari 2013 [interview]).  
Ironically, with an increase in the number of judges from eleven to fifteen, the makers of the 
Basic Law of 2012 returned to the much criticized design of the 1989 Constitution. The 
original idea was to have fifteen justices on the Court. A transitional provision of the 1989 
Constitution required five constitutional justices to be elected by the outgoing Communist 
parliament from 1985, another five justices to be elected by the parliament that was elected in 
1990 and the remaining five seats to be filled within a time frame of five years. Though, the 
number of seats on the Constitutional Court was reduced to eleven in 1994 (Uitz, 2013: 14).  
Another change that occurred in an amendment from 2010 concerned the structure of the 
Constitutional Court, and stated that the president of the Court from now on would be elected 
by the Parliament. Previously the president was elected by the justices from among 
themselves. It is a widely accepted phenomenon, promoted by, among others, the Venice 
Commission, that a political actor elects the president. Nonetheless, it could be said to be a 
regression in the independence of the Constitutional Court. However, the amendment 
lengthened the term of office from nine to twelve years, while terminating the possibility of 
re-election of the justices, which may contribute to a strengthening of their independence 
(Fröhlich and Csink, 2012: 436), as they don’t have to fear not being re-elected if they don’t 
act in accordance with government policies. Protection of tenure, in the form of non-
renewable terms of service, is seen as crucial to insulate judges so that they can make rulings 
with political costs for the government, without fearing political reactions to their decisions 
(Gloppen, 2004: 125). When terminating the possibility of re-election through the formal 
framework, judges’ ability to act independent increased, just as the theoretical framework 
suggests.  
4.3.4 The Removal of Actio Popularis 
Under the 1989 Constitution, the Constitutional Court responsibility was to maintain the 
integrity of the Constitution, and to annul and remove all norms that fell outside the frames of 
the Constitution. Anyone could challenge the constitutionality of a law or provision, and 
request the review of legislation if it was considered unconstitutional (Fröhlich and Csink, 
2012: 435). The competence of Actio Popularis was imbedded in the Constitution, and despite 
the fact that this jurisdiction was rather unusual in Europe, it became an effective way to keep 
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the government in constitutional line in Hungary. Furthermore, it made the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary one of the most powerful courts in the world (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]).  
Though, the Basic Law of 2012 eliminated the Actio Popularis jurisdiction and substituted it 
with a constitutional complaint based on the German model. The new system allows 
individuals to challenge laws only if the laws affect them personally (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 
142).
26
 The change from the abstract posterior review of legislation to the examination of 
individual complaints was the most apparent change in the field of state organization. The 
Basic Law of 2012 further allowed for both laws and judicial decisions to be challenged in the 
constitutional complaint proceedings. The ability of the Constitutional Court to review laws in 
the abstract is further limited by the fact that the range of initiators who have the competence 
to take the case to the court for abstract review are restricted to apply only to the Government, 
one-fourth of the MP’s, the President of the Curia, the Prosecutor General, or the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. Even the President of the Republic no longer has this 
power. As the Basic Law of 2012 abolished Actio Popularis and restricted the range of 
initiators, the importance of abstract review is reduced (Fröhlich and Csink, 2012: 435). By 
building restrictions on the Court’s competence into the formal framework of the court, so 
that the formal regulation of the court’s jurisdiction changes, judicial authority was weakened.   
Nonetheless, the elimination of Actio Popularis was a rational measure that can be defended. 
The workload was too burdensome, and caused delays in legal proceedings (Polgár 2013 
[interview]). Two-thirds of the petitions that the Court received came through the competence 
of Actio Popularis, and in the two first decades of the court, this was the main feature of 
judicial review. The caseload before the removal could reach 1500 cases per year. Now, the 
caseload has decreased to a minimum (Kovács 2013 [interview]). The removal of the 
competence can therefore be justified as a measure that decreased the heavy workload that the 
competence caused the Court, and caused a more efficient Court (Polgari 2013 [interview]).  
The Hungarian people can still approach the court, but as the abstract review is restricted to 
the institutions mentioned above, they will have to use these institutions as intermediaries in 
order to do so (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). That can improve the legal character of the 
complaint, and give it the expected judicial expression (Csink 2013 [interview]). However, 
that implies that the few institutions that now have the right to turn directly to the Court are 
willing to do so. It is worth noting that currently it’s not that easy to challenge the government 
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before the Court. So far, the right of abstract review has been applied to the minimum. The 
problem is the political context. The opposition is basically nonexistent, and far from 
unanimous enough to write a common petition to the Constitutional Court under present 
conditions (Csink 2013 [interview]). The chances of consensus building are unlikely (Uitz, 
2013: 32). The previous commissioner was very active and constantly challenging 
government policy and legislation. It was assumed that this was a result of the unlikeliness 
that he would ever be re-elected, and that he therefore knew that he had nothing to lose by 
being active (Kovács 2013 [interview]). Though, the incumbent commissioner, who was 
elected in 2013, has yet to introduce any petitions to the court. The Hungarian people are 
paying close attention to the new commissioner, and the fear is, considering that he is 
believed to be close to governing majority, that he won’t use the right at all (Polgari 2013 
[interview]).  
While the heavy workload caused by Actio Popularis was a negative feature, some people 
argue that an elimination of the competence was not the only solution. The Constitutional 
Court had the possibility to introduce a filtering system, similar to the system used in 
Strasbourg. “It was the Court’s responsibility to increase the efficiency of the court – not the 
government’s responsibility” (Kovács 2013 [interview]). The government chose to remove 
the competence, based on reasons claiming that the measure would make the Court more 
effective in the every-day work (Kovács 2013 [interview]). It has further been claimed that 
members of the Court supposedly proposed the removal of the competence, in order to reduce 
the workload and increase the efficiency (Mázi 2013 [interview]). This is true to some extent. 
The present chief justice of the Court wrote articles suggesting that there should be some form 
for eligibility criteria for the petitioner, in order to ease the workload, “but as far as I know, 
there were never any explicit request from the Court to remove Actio Popularis” (Fröhlich 
2013 [interview]).  
“Actio Popularis was a positive competence that motivated the Hungarian people to 
participate in the constitutional process. My personal opinion is that the government 
wanted to avoid that people turned the court, asking for judicial reviews of laws and 
regulations”  
(Kovács 2013 [interview]) 
The competence of Actio Popularis caused an active and powerful Court, and several of the 
judgments carried out by the Court in the 1990s came with political costs for the government 
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(Uitz, 2013: 8-10). “The Court overacted their role” (Mázi 2013 [interview]). It was argued 
that the Court interfered too much in political issues, and the government therefore saw the 
need to regulate and limit the activity of the court (Mázi 2013 [interview]). Constitutional 
amendments changed the formal framework of the Court, and restricted its jurisdiction. The 
consequence was a limitation in the formal authority of the Court. This can be seen in relation 
to the pendulum effect, in which I refer to in the theoretical chapter: when the manifest 
judicial independence is high, there is an increased likelihood that authorities will attempt to 
reign in the judiciary through reforms and measures limiting their formal authority and/or 
independence (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009).  
4.3.5 Constitutional Complaint 
The Basic Law of 2012 caused significant changes in the formal framework of the Court, and 
grants the Court new jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of judicial procedures and 
decisions through a new competence called constitutional complaint. The formal regulation of 
this competence in the constitution empowers the Court, and secures judicial authority.  
The mechanism of constitutional complaint includes that a person whose rights have been 
violated or affected by the concrete application of a law may approach the Constitutional 
Court in order to obtain redress. The Constitutional Court can thereafter decide on one of the 
following three outcomes: (a) that there has been no violation of rights, (b) or that a violation 
of rights was a result of an unconstitutional interpretation of a constitutional law, (c) or that a 
violation of rights was directly caused by the application of an unconstitutional law. Despite 
the fact that the Court still retains the power to find laws unconstitutional, it is one mechanism 
short in relation to the repair of unconstitutional interpretations of law. The elimination of the 
Actio Popularis restricts citizens to only bring cases that involve infringements of their own 
rights to the Court, or cases in which the law does not provide the possibility for a legal 
remedy. Judges from the ordinary courts are still given the possibility to petition the 
Constitutional Court to review a law that is thought to be unconstitutional before it is applied 
in a concrete case, just as they have been able to do since the transition in 1990 (Bánkuti et 
al., 2012b: 261).  
The new system of constitutional complaint has been well received by both the Court and 
other state organizations, and as the system is still very new, it is difficult to criticize it just 
yet. Through this system, individuals have to prove that a statue or a law affects them directly, 
in order to bring the case to the Constitutional Court. The easiest route to the Court is to take 
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the case to the ordinary court, and then let that court decide if the case is worth taking further 
in the system. The idea behind the introduction of the system was that it could create more 
efficiency within the court (Jakab 2013 [interview]), and increase the Court’s power as they 
were given the opportunity to supervise ordinary courts’ decisions (Sepsi 2013 [interview]). 
However, as there was a fear that the system would cause people to come directly to the Court 
in order to complain, a filtering system was introduced. Consequential, only a small amount 
of cases come through the system, and few cases are declared admissible by the Court. The 
workload of the Court is too low (Kovács 2013 [interview]), and there are few successful 
complaints – and too few cases in progress (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). “So far, in light of 
statistics, the constitutional complaint procedure has not met with the prior expectations” 
(Tóth, B 2013 [interview]).  
4.3.6 Abolishing the Age Limit  
In 2013, the Government of Hungary wanted to abolish a provision stating that the mandate of 
justices in the Constitutional Court shall end when they turn 70 years old (The Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee, 2014: 6). The original rule had neither been revised nor applied since the 
beginning of the Court, but as a result of the amendment, the mandate of Constitutional Court 
judges, including the mandate of current ones, now allows judges that were elected after 2010 
to remain in their seats until the end of their 12-year term. The consequence of the abolishing 
of the upper age limit of 70 years in the case of elected Constitutional Court judges, including 
current serving judges, is that several of them will be able to decide on cases even when they 
will be close to 80 years old (The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2013). The provision was 
convenient, considering that the governing majority had just nominated and elected five new 
judges as a result of the increasing number of judges of the Court. According to the new rule, 
the mandate of these five newly elected judges will not terminate when they turn 70 years old, 
as it would have done under the old provision. For instance, the mandate of István Balsai will 
be extended with 6 years and 5 months, and the mandate of Egon Dienes-Oehm with 8 years 
and 8 months (The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2013). When changing the formal 
framework in terms of retirement conditions, the government made sure that the composition 
of the Court was mostly in favor of their own policy preferences. That contributed to a change 
of corporate culture, despite the presence of a formal framework, within the judiciary, which 
influences the willingness of the judges to realize their potential for independence, and thus 
act in an independent manner. The formal framework was changed in order to enhance the 
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presence of judges who are less likely to deliver judgments with political costs for the 
government.  
The abolishing of the age limit is a paradox though, as the governing majority terminated the 
mandate of 274 ordinary judges before they reached the age of 70 in a similar way; only that 
in the case of the ordinary judges, the retirement age was lowered by an amendment to the 
law.
27
 Whilst the lowered retirement age in the ordinary judiciary caused a forced retirement 
of hundreds of judges, the Constitutional Court judges, who are elected exclusively by the 
governing majority for 12 years terms, will be able to decide on cases and review laws even 
when some of them will be close to 80 years old (Tóth, B 2013 [interview]). “The 
diminishment of the retirement age secured the representation of judges loyal to the 
government” (Polgari 2013 [interview]).  
Most of the judges appointed by the governing majority after 2010 were quite old. When 
diminishing the upper age limit, the government secured that these judges could remain in 
office for a longer period. A remark was added to the provision stating that the age limit is 
still 70, but judges elected after 2010 can remain in their positions after having turned 70 
years old (Jakáb 2013 [interview]).  
“That makes all the sense in the world: the judges appointed by the government were 
all appointed after 2010. Judges appointed before 2010, by a balanced council of 
judges, will have to retire by the age of 70. This is something that, in my opinion, 
shouldn’t take place in a civilized constitutional culture. Though, that is the problem 
here: there is no constitutional culture, and the government lacks respect for the 
constitutional rule.”  
(Jakab 2013 [interview]) 
4.3.7 The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment, affective from February 2013, affected the role of the Constitutional 
Court in several ways. A number of provisions were taken to a constitutional level, in 
response to earlier decisions of the Court. Other provisions affected its functioning, by 
directly changing the jurisdiction of the Court. The legal framework of the Court was 
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changed, and formal regulations that worked to protect the jurisdiction of the Court were 
removed. The restrictions in the Court’s jurisdiction weakened the judicial authority.28  
A consequence of the amendment is that the Constitutional Court can no longer reject 
constitutional amendments on matters that concern its substance – only on procedural grounds 
(The Economist, 2013). That means that the Court can only review the acquiescence of the 
Basic Law, and the amendments to the Basic Law thereof, for conformity with the procedural 
requirements that are contained in the Basic Law pertaining to the adoption and promulgation 
of the Basic Law or its amendments.
29
  
The Fourth Amendment further states that Constitutional Court decisions that were given 
prior to the entry into force of the Basic Law, 1 January 2012, are hereby repealed.
30
 All 
previous rulings are void, and should hereafter have no bearing on the future decisions by the 
Court (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2014: 6). Though, when constitutionalizing 
issues that were previously deemed unconstitutional by the Court, the Basic Law of 2012 
challenges the role of the Court as a guardian of constitutionality and the main control organ 
in the democratic system of checks and balances (Grabow 2013 [interview]). The Court must 
now ignore more than two decades of legal precedent, and base future rulings on the Basic 
Law of 2012. The legal maneuver has a significant outcome: the government has used the 
measure to pass laws that might otherwise be rejected by the Court. The amendments in the 
fourth round since the enactment of the constitution included several laws that the Court had 
previously rejected, such as limits on political advertising in election campaigns and homeless 
penalizing. As these laws were amendments to the constitution, they can  be further amended 
only with a two-thirds majority, something that limits the scope of future governments to 
change them (The Economist, 2013). “It is such an aggressive way of doing politics” (Grabow 
2013 [interview]).  
It is emphasized that the provision is without prejudice to the legal effect that was produced 
by those decisions. That means that the Court’s rulings do not lose their binding force, and 
laws that have been annulled by the Court do not enter into force again. However, the Court 
will no longer have the ability or obligation to refer to these decisions. That basically means 
that, in substance, the Court could come to the same conclusions as before, but without 
referring to its earlier jurisprudence (The Venice Commission, 2013). Thus, the Court is 
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obliged to ignore years of legal precedent, and base future decisions on the constitution that 
was enacted in January 2012 (The Economist, 2013). Moreover, laws that had earlier been 
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court were later included in the Basic Law of 
2012, which means that the Court can no longer strike out these laws and regulations (The 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2014: 6).   
Furthermore, a provision of the Fourth Amendment provides that the Court shall review cases 
for conformity with the Basic Law, originating from the proposal of any ordinary judge, 
immediately – but no later than within thirty days.31 That means that in concrete review cases, 
the Court is obliged to fit its whole procedure, including the distribution of the decision, 
within a timeframe of thirty days (The Venice Commission, 2013).  
4.4 A New Beginning for the Judiciary: the Act of 2011 
The continuous difficulties of the ordinary judicial system, all included as important factors in 
a thorough analysis of the situation, caused the legislators to draw the consequences that a 
new system of administrative and professional direction of justice was needed. The 
conclusion was that the system should contain certain elements of various models of 
administrations, while at the same time enable immediate measures. It was suggested that a 
new system should be based on already existing institutional grounds, though radically 
renewing the foundations of these grounds (The Curia of Hungary, 2014)(Tóth, A 2013 
[interview]).  
While the act of 1990 and 1997 were unmodified when the new government was elected in 
2010, it soon became apparent that changes were inevitable. A modification process was 
therefore initiated in 2010 by the new government, and the consequences of this process were 
changes in the administration of the NCJ. Rights which previously fell within the NCJ’s 
jurisdiction were now transferred to the head of the NCJ, who also functioned as the President 
of the Supreme Court. It was argued that this measure would increase the efficiency of the 
NCJ, as the head of the NCJ would be more available than the NCJ of 1997, which only met 
once a month (Juhász 2013 [interview]). Though, the change proved to be ineffective. With 
both the presidency of the NCJ and the Supreme Court comes great authority, but also great 
responsibility. The Supreme Court has the right to make unified decisions that are binding for 
all courts, and the main responsibility is to monitor the work of lower level courts. The 
presidency of the Supreme Court requires both time and effort, and when the President was 
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put in charge of new areas of administration within the judiciary, the workload increased. It 
was difficult to allocate time, and the tendency was that too much time was spent working on 
administrative issues, and too little time was spent on professional jurisdiction (Tóth, A 2013 
[interview]).  
4.4.1 The Three-Level System  
Consequently, the Act of 2011, on Administration and Organization of the Judiciary, declared 
that the judiciary worked best if the two functions were kept separated, with the head of the 
Supreme Court
32
 being responsible for the professional supervision of the judiciary and the 
unified application of the law, and a president of the newly established organ the National 
Office of the Judiciary
33
 being responsible for the administration of the judiciary (Juhász 2013 
[interview]). The act, together with the Act of 2011, on the Status and Remuneration of 
Judges, was aimed at the elimination of the problems mentioned above, and worked to 
provide a new path that could lead to a more up-to-date and efficient system. With the 
implementation of the new constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, effective as of 1 
January 2012, it was decided that the administrative and professional competences should be 
separated within the framework of the new system. As of 1 January 2012, a three-level system 
was introduced.
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Changed its name to the Curia (Kúria) of Hungary  from 1 January 2012 
33
 Hereinafter referred to as NOJ 
34
 Model 1 provides a summarized overview of the three-level system as of 1 January 2012 
75 
 
Figure 2: A Three-Level System of Judicial Administration 
 
(The Curia of Hungary, 2014) 
The central administration of courts is now assigned to the President of the NOJ, who is 
supported by deputies and the office. Administrative competences, such as budgetary and 
personnel administration, appointment of higher judicial leaders, contact between branches 
and assessment of the applications for judiciary posts, were transferred from NCJ and its 
president – who was president of the Supreme Court at the same time -  to the president of 
NOJ. Thus, the Curia, whose president provides professional guidance, and the president of 
the NOJ, who manage the administration of courts, have been separated (The Curia of 
Hungary, 2014). The president is given an office and a staff that works to assist the president 
in his or hers work. “The NOJ acts as an administrative body, and a consultative adviser, that 
assists and prepares the work of its chairman” (Juhász 2013 [interview]). The independence of 
the president of the NOJ is ensured by the fact that only a judge can occupy the position. It is 
further stipulated that the president of the NOJ is nominated by the President of The 
Hungarian Republic, and elected by the parliament. An independent body, the National 
Judicial Council,
35
 a supreme judicial self-government body, comprising exclusively judges, 
performs supervisory and control functions to ensure that the president stays within the 
framework of the NOJ (Juhász 2013 [interview]). The NJC is composed of fifteen judges, 
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where fourteen of them are ordinary, elected members, and the last place belongs to the 
president of the Curia. The NJC meets on a regularly basis, and based on an agenda they make 
the necessary decisions. The responsibility of the NJC is limited to the control of the NOJ and 
the decisions of the president of the office. The NJC deals with few administrative issues, but 
there are areas of judicial administration in which the NJC’s consent is needed. These areas 
are described by the law (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]). However, the NJC’s decisions are not 
binding, and its opinions can be ignored. Thus, The Venice Commission (2013: 16) has on 
several occasions emphasized the need to enhance and strengthen the role of the NJC as a 
control instance. The Fourth Amendment of 2013 went in the opposite direction, and raised 
the position of the president of the NOJ to the constitutional level by giving the presidency the 
power to exercise the central responsibilities related to the administration of courts. Increased 
legitimacy to the president has come at the expense of accountability, and the necessary 
limitations and the checks and balances are nonexistent.  The NJC wasn’t even mentioned in 
the Basic Law.  
4.4.2 The President of the National Office for the Judiciary 
 
“The President of NOJ shall bear a serious personal responsibility for the central 
administration and for its effective operation, i.e. to perform the president’s duties – as 
enshrined in the Act of Parliament – with due regard to the constitutional principle of 
judicial independence.” 
(National Office for the Judiciary, 2014) 
The presidency of the NOJ comes with great advantages and extraordinary power, and can 
both appoint judges, and promote and demote judges presently sitting anywhere in the 
judiciary. The president is elected for a nine-year term by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, 
and when the term expires, the president can be replaced only by a candidate who can gather a 
two-thirds vote of parliament. If it were to happen that parliament are unable to agree on a 
successor, the president may be stay in office until a new candidate musters the required 
legislative supermajority (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 143). While it can be criticized that the 
president is elected by a two-thirds majority, due to the circumstances in which Fidesz has a 
supermajority, it is a widely accepted phenomenon that a political actor, such as the 
parliament, elects representatives to such offices. “It is a constitutional guarantee that the 
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leader of such an important institution is elected by the parliament. I don’t find that 
problematic at all” (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]).  
The current president of the NOJ is Tüende Handó, a former judge and president of the 
Budapest Labour Court. She happens to be the wife of József Szájer, a founding member of 
Fidesz, who is credited as the writer of the preamble of the new Hungarian constitution - on 
his iPad on the train between Brussels and Strasbourg (Rozenberg, 2012). Szájer resigned his 
posts in the domestic Fidesz party as soon as his wife was appointed the president, but he 
remains a chair of the Fidesz group in the European Parliament. Moreover, Mrs. Handó is also 
a former college roommate and lifelong friend of the wife of the Prime Minister, Viktor 
Orbán (Lendvai, 2012: 223). It is difficult to see how a person, who is a close friend with the 
prime minister and his wife, and married to one of the chief authors of the new constitution, 
can appear to be a neutral person. And not least, it is difficult to assume that the appointment 
of Mrs. Handó is one big coincidence. Consequently, the appointment has caused a lot of 
dismay. The president possesses great powers, and with great power comes great 
responsibility.  It is an undisputed expectation that the president has to be a judge, with some 
legal experience within leadership. Moreover, as it soon became apparent that the president of 
NOJ had little leadership experience within the judicial system, the theory, promoted by some 
observers, that personal friends and acquaintances of the Prime Minister are put in key 
positions, was strengthened. “The president’s relation to the political elite is a problem, and 
questions the legitimacy of the office as a whole, and the independence of the president” 
(Polgari 2013 [interview]). Though, the allegations have been met with objections that state 
that the president had enough professional executive experiences from court organization 
through her many years as president of the Budapest Labour Court (Juhász 2013 [interview]). 
However, it does not change the fact that she is a close friend with the prime minister.  
Considering that the president is the one responsible for the promotion and demotion of 
judges, the appointment of judges and disciplinary proceedings, her close ties to the governing 
party threaten the independence of her position. “It is certainly worrying that newly appointed 
president is not seen as political impartial. Her political background has a bad appearance” 
(Miklosi 2013 [interview]). While the president, and judges in general, is prohibited by law 
from being a member of a political party, it is obvious that there is some connection between 
her and the governing party, and the Prime Minister, nonetheless. That makes it easy to draw 
a conclusion that the president reflects the prevailing political preferences of the ruling 
majority - and that her judicial decisions are a function of this. Given the president’s 
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competences, such as the unlimited power to appoint and replace judges, it is a serious threat 
to her independence that she is considered to be a Fidesz loyalist – and thus act in accord with 
the preferences of the governing party. Occupants of offices with such important powers 
should not be directly connected to the governing majority, and consequently, should not 
make decisions and appointments based on the policy preferences of Fidesz. Adding that the 
Chief Prosecutor of Hungary, an official that is in charge of the prosecution of cases at the 
national level, is himself a highly controversial Fidesz loyalist, the sharp criticism of the new 
legal landscape by the purged president is more than understandable.  “Important offices like 
these should not be held by people with political backgrounds” (Miklosi 2013 [interview]).  
However, up until now, the president has been less biased in decisions and appointments than 
the expectations implied, and her independence has, consequently, been less questioned than 
expected (Polgari 2013 [interview]). “The chairwoman is highly respected, and voices from 
the opposition who questioned her independence in the beginning have mostly subsided now” 
(Juhász 2013 [interview]). Handó has not been in the position for that long, so it’s too early to 
judge her way of handling the new responsibilities (Miklosi 2013 [interview], but even if she 
exercises the powers with the necessary professionalism, the powers of this position is 
unprecedented in the European practice. The powers are vast, and leave the affected actors 
with an inability to appeal or contest her decisions (Scheppele, 2012). Both when appointing 
and firing judges, reassigning them to new jobs and evaluating them, as well as in the 
administration of courts, the president’s word is both first and last in this process. Though, it 
must be added that currently, at the request of the international community, with EU at the 
forefront, there is an ongoing process in which the president’s vast powers are being 
challenged. 
The judiciary’s ability to act in an independent manner is seen to depend on institutional 
structures that can insulate the judiciary from political interference and secure judicial 
authority. That includes formal rules that can limit the executive’s influence over judicial 
appointments. The formal framework of the ordinary judiciary grants significant power to the 
president of the NOJ in terms of appointment, vetting and nomination procedures, and that 
should be sufficient to protect the judiciary from undue executive influence. Though, the 
formal rules are a promise of judicial independence that only holds under certain political 
conditions. When the president of the NOJ is seen as an extension of the government, it is 
likely to believe that the governing majority is able to exert strong governmental influence 
over the composition of the judicial nominating body, through the supposedly independent 
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presidency of the NOJ. The judicial selection process in Hungary shows some illustrative 
signs of this. “The main problem today is that politics interfere with the judiciary and its 
work, and not the other way around” (Polgari 2013 [interview]). This illustrates how the 
corporate culture can affect judges to act in a less independent manner, despite the presence of 
a formal framework that can provide judges with more ability to act independent.  
4.4.3 The Nomination of Judges 
The constitutional reforms since 2010 has brought with it changes for the ordinary judiciary 
with regard to the appointment and reassignment process for judges. While judges in the old 
system were selected by panels consisting of their fellow judges, the judges in the new system 
are selected by the President of the NOJ. The President of the office has the power to select 
new judges, promote and denote any judge, to select leaders of each of the courts, and to 
begin disciplinary proceedings (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 143). Furthermore, the president is the 
one who is in charge of the timing and terms of the judicial tenders through which candidates 
that are interested can apply for the positions available. When choosing a new judge, 
according to the cardinal acts on the structure of the judiciary, the president of the National 
Judicial Office must select a candidate from among the top three candidates recommended by 
local councils of judges from the court in which the appointment will be made. There are 
requirements that the applicant has to be a judge, and having reached the age of thirty 
years(The Basic Law of Hungary, 2012).
 36
  The president sets up the process through which 
candidates may apply, and can select either any judge from the list or reject the judge’s list 
and start the process over again if necessary. If the president decides to reject the top 
candidates, then the decision can, as a result of amendments to the law in 2012, be vetoed by 
the National Judicial Council. Thus, by the time these limits were placed on her powers, 
almost ten percent of the judiciary was replaced without this check. However, the president 
still has substantial power, and can call for a new tender. Most of the relevant aspects of the 
process are controlled for by the president, and Mrs. Handó can, among other things, attend 
all meetings that the judicial councils held in order to make their recommendations to her. The 
president of the Hungarian Republic must sign off on all new judicial appointments, but has 
yet not refused any appointments made by the current government. The fact that the 
appointments are subject to the approval of the president is in theory a strong check on 
president of the NOJ’s appointing theory. However, given the president of the NOJ’s strong 
power, and the government’s control over the president of the republic, the approval becomes 
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a formality. Whether this is due to the rumors that he is a Fidesz loyalist, is not known 
(Grabow 2013 [interview]). Though, he was elected by the Fidesz parliamentary 
supermajority. Nevertheless, the president of the NOJ possesses all power in relation to the 
promotion and demotion of judges sitting anywhere in the judiciary (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 
262), and the general administration of the judiciary and the control of judges. There are no 
procedures for judges to contest the decisions of the president, unless a judge has been asked 
to resign from the position (Scheppele, 2012).  
Under the old constitutional order, judges ran the process of judicial appointment themselves. 
That made it difficult for the government of the day to control and influence judicial 
appointments. The new constitutional order brought with it a solution in which one person 
selects all new judges. When Mrs. Handó, in 2012, announced that she was to fill more than 
100 judgeships, it soon became clear that only a few of these were already judges. That means 
that most of these positions were given to judicial newcomers. While new judges are allowed 
within the Hungarian legal system for a three-year probationary term, the government 
carefully pays attentions to their actions in order to decide on their reappointments 
(Scheppele, 2012). Knowing that the occupation of the offices depends on how the 
government, or the president of the NOJ, evaluates the work they do, judges may act more 
cautious – as they fear that they will be punished for independent-minded judgments 
(Gloppen et al., 2010: 122). While formal frameworks that includes structural regulations that 
includes life tenure or long renewable terms are assumed to prevent judges from considering 
the political reactions to their decisions, and thus increase the likelihood of delivering 
judgments with political cost for the government, a probationary term of three years can cause 
judges to act according to the political preferences of the government.  
4.4.4 The Age Issue  
 
“Except for the President of the Curia and President of the National Office for the 
Judiciary, the service relationship of judges shall terminate upon their reaching the 
general retirement age” 
 (The Basic Law of Hungary, 2012)
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The Hungarian Government adopted, in 2011, a legislation that lowered the mandatory 
retirement for judges, prosecutors and public notaries from 70 to 62 years, starting on the day 
the new Constitution went into effect (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 262). The law terminated the 
mandate of 274
38
 ordinary judges within a very short transition period of one year, and forced 
them into early retirement. The 274 judges included eight of the 20 court presidents at the 
county level, two of five appeals court presidents and 20 of the 80 Supreme Court judges 
(Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 262). The judges were replaced with nominees that were both 
nominated and appointed by one single politically appointed individual: the President of the 
NOJ. Hungarian officials claimed that the change was necessary in order to standardize the 
retirement age for all public employees. In June 2012, a group of judges submitted complaints 
to the European Court of Human rights, assisted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 
claiming that early dismissal was a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee argued that the judges’ expectations that they continue 
until they reached the age of 70 was protected by the right to property, and the law was 
therefore against both the property right and EU law. Furthermore, as the early retirement 
didn’t apply in a mandatory manner to other professionals, it was a discriminative measure, 
the organization added. The Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional in July 
2012, because both its content and formal framework breached constitutional requirements 
stemming from the independence of judges. The declaration further emphasized the short 
transition period, and stated that such a change could only gradually, over an appropriate 
transitional period, be introduced (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013: 17-18).  
The Court of Justice of the European Union, on the request of the European Union, started 
infringement procedures on the basis of age discrimination. The conclusion was that such an 
abrupt and radical lowering of the retirement age for judges was incompatible with EU law 
because it violated the EU equal treatment rules by constituting unjustified age discrimination 
at the workplace. As EU rules in equal treatment in employment prohibit discrimination at the 
workplace on grounds of age it was stated by the Commission that Hungary should take all 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment as soon as possible, as there was not found 
any objective justification for the lowering of the retirement age. Furthermore, the 
contradiction caused by a drastic lowering in age limit, and then a sudden raise as of 2014, the 
measure was seen as both disproportionate and incoherent – and not in compliance with EU 
law (The Europen Commission, 2012).  
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Hungary later satisfied the Commission by bringing its legislation in line with EU law. The 
Hungarian Parliament adopted a new law on 11 March 2013 that lowered the retirement age 
for judges to 65 over period of 10 years (2022), rather than lowering it to 62 over one year, as 
before (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013: 17). This adjusts it to the general 
retirement age in Hungary of 65 years. The new law further provided all judges and 
prosecutors who had been forced to retire before the right to be reinstated in their posts, 
without having to bring a case to court. They were moreover promised compensation for 
remuneration that was lost during the period they were out of work. The Commission has 
closely monitored that the new legislation is implemented correctly in practice (The Europen 
Commission, 2013). Though, most of the judges affected by the law never returned to the 
judiciary. Those who did were not necessarily reinstated in previous positions, as most of 
these positions had already been filled.  Not to mention, several of the dismissed judges didn’t 
want to go back (Csink 2013 [interview]). The infringement procedure by EU illustrates how 
much influence underlying variables, such as the presence of protective constituencies, has on 
the formal framework for judicial independence and authority. EU made it costly for the 
Hungarian government to lower the retirement age by threatening to sanction them 
financially. That could complicate Hungary’s efforts to secure the aid that were needed to 
remain solvent (Polgár 2013 [interview]).  
The positions that were left open were replaced by the current government. As the usual 
procedures for appointing judges was suspended until the new constitution came into effect 
six months later, the government had even more new judgeships to fill. An act, adopted in 
June 2011, halted all appointment procedures for judges between that date and January 1, 
2012 – and the combined effects of the two laws, one lowering the retirement age for judges 
and the other blocking the appointment procedure, gave Fidesz the power to appoint judges to 
about 10 percent of all judicial posts in the country (Bánkuti et al., 2012a: 143-144). When the 
infringement procedure was pending, the government quickly filled the then newly opened 
judgeships (The Europen Commission, 2012). This was met with fierce criticism from the 
opposition, who claimed that this was just another attempt from the government to make sure 
that the judiciary was filled with people close to the majority. Critics have seen the provision 
as undermining the independence of courts because it gives the governing majority a chance 
to directly influence the appointment of new judges. “It is not really about age – it is a 
question about what is more beneficial to the government” (Polgari 2013 [interview]). Not to 
mention, it may infringe on the human rights of the dismissed judges. The law made the 
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independence of the judiciary a fiction, as it gave the president of the NOJ a chance to replace 
about 10 percent of all the judicial posts in the country (Grabow 2013 [interview]). The 
tendency was that these positions were filled with judges who were loyal to the governing 
majority – and, most importantly, judicial newcomers (Scheppele, 2012). The fact that the 
president of the NOJ, who is believed to have ties to Fidesz, were able to make significant 
efforts to create a judiciary that is beneficial to the government  can provide some explanatory 
power for judicial development. The radical changes in the composition of the courts are 
clearly correlated with the jurisprudence developed the last couple of years. 
Worth adding is that the President of the Curia, András Baka, spoke out strongly about the 
law that suspended all new judicial appointments until the Basic Law came into effect on 
January 1, 2012. The law on mandatory retirement age therefore provided that the president of 
the Curia had to have at least five years of judicial experience in Hungary. This formulation 
contributed to the removal of Baka, on 1 January 2012, although his mandate didn’t expire 
until June 2015. As Baka had 17 years of experience as a judge on the European Court of 
Human Rights, he was “disqualified” as the president of the Curia. It has been suggested that 
this pretext was invented in order to remove what most people characterized as a 
conservative, but independent and internationally respected judge, as he had publicly opposed 
government policies, such as the establishment of a new National Judicial Office. The 
removal was stated as both unlawful and unprecedented (Lendvai, 2012: 222), and illustrates 
that there are no guarantees for tenure security if caught opposing the governing majority. He 
was replaced by Péter Darák, a previous Supreme Court justice and academic – elected by the 
Fidesz parliament, with their two-thirds majority (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]).  
In general, protection of tenure, meaning that the judges’ can’t be removed unless exceptional 
circumstances, is an important structural factor that works to protect the judiciary from 
political inference. Judges in Hungary are given long nonrenewable terms that terminate upon 
them reaching the general retirement age. Though, the sudden change in the retirement age, 
from 70 to 62 (in the beginning), removed senior judges that still had years left within the 
judiciary and had well-founded expectations that they would be able to remain in office until 
they turned 70, had it not been for the unexpected law – a law that left them with no 
possibility to plan their retirements (Miklosi 2013 [interview]). The law changed the formal 
framework, and weakened structural regulations regarding tenure protection. The result was a 
violation of the principle that judges cannot be removed, which is a crucial guarantee of 
judges’ ability to act in an independent manner. While judges in Hungary have remained in 
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office during changing administrations throughout the years, and even through the transition 
in 1989, the more or less forced resignations, disguised as an adjustment of the retirement age 
to the standardized retirement age for all public employees, in 2012, allowed the government, 
and the president of the NOJ, to appoint new judges shortly after taking office (Grabow 2013 
[interview]).  
4.4.5 The Transfer of Cases 
The Act on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law, an amendment passed at the 
very end of 2011, introduced the possibility to transfer cases to other courts (The Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee, 2014: 7). The idea was that the provision could remedy the issue of an 
extremely unbalanced workload of the Hungarian Courts, as it had done in other EU Member 
States (Martonyi, 2013). The amendment allowed the president of the NOJ and the chief 
prosecutor to reassign specific cases from the courts in which they are assigned by law to 
specific courts any other place in the country – according to their assessment of the courts’ 
relative workloads, and without being accompanied by reasons for the reassignment. A 
consequence of this amendment was that the president of the NOJ and the chief prosecutor 
were given the ability to decide which judge should hear each case. It was believed that this 
measure could improve the efficiency of courts (Bánkuti et al., 2012b: 263), as the courts in 
Budapest, and other large cities, were critically overloaded, and overbooked, with cases 
(Polgari 2013 [interview]). “The NOJ was eager to speed up procedures, which is an 
understandable goal, but it only put the independence of the judiciary in question” (Polgari 
2013 [interview]).  
As there was nothing in the law that could preclude or even evaluate that the president of the 
NOJ and the chief prosecutor were using the new power as a tool to choose judges that were 
favorable to the government side, the law caused fierce criticism claiming that this was a 
serious assault on judicial independence. It further served as an excuse to attack the 
Hungarian judiciary as a whole. In the first set of reassignments, made in the first months of 
2012, three
39
 of the nine cases that were assigned to other courts had distinct political 
overtones and came off as very sensitive. As there were no criteria for the selection of which 
cases and to which courts they should be transferred, the introduction of the possibility to 
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 High-profile corruption case brought against MSzP officials by the public prosecutor was moved to 
Kecskemét, which was led by a president who was one of few court leaders in the country who did not sign the 
petition to the government protesting its judicial reforms, an appeal by a Fidesz party member from a criminal 
conviction for corruption, and a case against a firm involved in alleged real estate speculation that has 
generated substantial interest among members of the far-right Jobbik party.  
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transfer cases was highly controversial, and caused criticism from both the EU and the Venice 
Commission (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2014: 7). Not to mention, the transfer of 
cases occurred in a context in which 10 percent of all judgeships were to be filled with new 
judges – by a judicial leader with close ties to the government, and with few legal constraints 
on her actions (Scheppele, 2012). Furthermore, as courts’ control over their caseload is 
included as an important regulation that protects the courts’ jurisdiction, and thus secure 
judicial authority, as illustrated in the theoretical framework, the regulation was said to lower 
the judges’ ability to act independently.  
However, the Fifth Amendment
40
 eliminated the possibility to transfer cases from one 
jurisdiction to another, in line with international criticism (Miklosi 2013 [interview]). “That 
contributed to the restoration of the individual judges’ independence” (Miklosi 2013 
[interview]). Yet, that did not settle the situation for the cases that had already been 
transferred (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2014: 7), and the issue of disproportionate 
burdens on some courts will now have to be handled through structural and organizational 
changes (Mázi 2013 [interview]).  
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion – What is the State of the Judiciary? 
Both the ordinary judiciary and the Constitutional Court have gone through major changes 
within the last decades. I would argue that these changes have caused a weaker judiciary, with 
less ability and willingness to act independent. Furthermore, these developments should be 
seen on the basis of the political context in Hungary, and the political process that began in 
April 2010, when Fidesz won the general election in Hungary. I will in this chapter 
summarize and conclude the findings in this study, and relate them to the theoretical 
expectations.  
5.1 Efficiency at the Expense of Independence in the Ordinary Judiciary?   
 
“The current model of judicial administration is the third of its kind since the 
democratic transition in 1989. None of them has proven effective enough in making 
the judiciary compatible with democracy. It’s a failure.”  
(Fleck 2013 [interview]) 
The process of judicial administration since 1989 has been a complicated process, and the two 
previous models were both met with criticism after a few years of use. “We can never achieve 
a perfect system. Though, what we can do it to constantly strive to improve it. That is what we 
try to do” (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]). The current three-level model was introduced as an 
attempt to eliminate the problems of the previous two models, while introducing a modern 
and efficient judicial system, compatible with democracy. The Act of 2011 introduced a 
unique administration of justice that Europe had never seen before, with a strong President 
that has the administrative authority to decide in important questions and the responsibility to 
appoint judges. However, two years after it was introduced, the three-level model now meets 
both criticism and appreciation.  
“The new system is complicated, but there are guarantees of judicial independence on each 
level” (Tóth, A 2013 [interview]). While the new model is still quite new, it is, according to 
the NOJ a very good one. It is argued that the system is more transparent than ever before, 
both because of the requirement to publish decisions and voting – and because of the constant 
demands for continuous reporting about the work of the office to both parliament and the 
President of the Hungarian Republic (Juhász 2013 [interview]). “There has been a lot of 
critique, but the third model has never been criticized for a lack of transparency” (Tóth, A 
2013 [interview]). “The third model is a young model. It is not a perfect model, but it is a 
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process of constant development – and we are constantly working to improve it and to 
increase the efficiency” (Juhász 2013 [interview]) 
Nonetheless, the system has met criticism since it was introduced, both from international and 
national level. The model is unique in Europe, and involves a strong one-person central 
administration (Fleck 2013 [interview]). It is a system in which one person possesses the 
power to both appoint the judges and effectively transfer them to other courts for one year 
within a three-year period - or even sack them. The president further has the mandate to 
administer the courts, as well as both draw up court rules and initiate legislation on the courts. 
Not to mention, the person holds some 60 other specified legal powers. This individual is also 
given a nine-year term of office, and, what is even more debated: this powerful person might 
remain in office when the mandate expires – unless a successor can gather a two-thirds 
majority in the Hungarian parliament (Fleck 2013 [interview]). “The one-person 
administration questions the judicial independence” (Fleck 2013 [interview]).  
While the council model of 1997 was criticized for being both unbalanced and poorly 
designed, the present system, which was among the first political decisions of the new 
government, faces some major challenges that can’t be ignored. The main focus of the system 
is a more efficient judiciary, and while efficiency was a deficiency in the former system, it 
can also question the independence, integrity and autonomy of both the judges and the 
judiciary in general. An efficient system often equals a very centralized system, and in this 
case that means placing the power in the hands of one person (Fleck 2013 [interview]). While 
most people working within the judiciary acknowledged the need for reform of the judiciary 
in order to increase the efficiency, the conclusion today, by for instance the The Venice 
Commission (2012), is that the reform as a whole threatens the independence of the judiciary. 
The main issue, among other, is the concentration of unheard-of powers in the hands of the 
president of the NJO alone, and the extraordinarily long term of the president’s office. “In no 
other member state of the Council of Europe are such important powers, including the power 
to select judges and senior office holders, vested in one single person” (The Venice 
Commission, 2012). The president has inordinate and uncontrollable power over the 
administration of the judiciary which is rather unprecedented in Europe. Moreover, as the 
extensive powers of the president, and the lack of the appropriate accountability, are strongly 
criticized, it is insisted in backgrounds documents to the Basic Law that the president operates 
under the effective control of the NJC and of Parliament. Though, the council’s decisions are 
not binding, and its opinions can be ignored. According to the Venice Commissions, the NJC 
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“has scarcely any significant powers and its role in the administration of the judiciary can be 
regarded as negligible” (2012).  
The judicial reform has caused waves of criticism. To Europe, these changes and practices 
come off as measure to extend the political control of the judiciary. The rapid acceleration of 
European critique regarding the judiciary is a signal that the transformation of the judicial 
system has hit a European nerve (Scheppele, 2012). The Venice Commission (2012) has 
concluded that the changes within the judiciary, especially the concentrations of powers in the 
hands of one official, “contradict the European standard.” Judicial independence requires that 
judges can act free of political influence. Though, the new constitutional order has brought 
with it changes that places the power to both appoint, promote and removed judges in the 
hands of one person – a person with intimate ties to the inner circle of Fidesz, the governing 
party. Changes in the nomination process of judges, as well as the forced retirement of 
hundreds of judges, are serious measures implemented by the government that makes it 
difficult for Hungary to guarantee that judges will remain independent. Moreover, it will take 
strong judges not to be swayed when the person who appoints them also has the power to 
control their judicial career. “No wonder Europe is worried about judicial independence in 
Hungary” (Scheppele, 2012).  
5.2 Has the Constitutional Court Surrendered?  
 
“The Constitutional Court has put down their gun – and surrendered”  
(Tóth, B 2013 [interview]) 
For more than two decades, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been a constitutional 
guardian and the primary check on the government – and the Court played an important role 
in the democratic transition in 1989, as an interpreter of the new constitutional order. Tpday, 
the role of the Court is limited, and the jurisdiction of the Court is by no means as broad as it 
used to be. There is an opinion stating that this development was partly natural, and thus 
predictable. As democratic standards were established throughout the 1990s, and the legal 
system was purged of unconstitutional elements, there was not much room left for an active 
Court (Fröhlich 2013 [interview]). “Democracy is stable, and we have well-functioning legal 
institutions” [Szántho 2013 [interview]). However, the explanation falls short when faced 
with the serious condition of the Constitutional Court today.  
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It must be mentioned that the Court played a very active role in the early 1990s, and there 
were concerns that the Court was too powerful. Several of the Court’s judgments in fiscal 
matters came with great economic consequences, and its wide jurisdiction caused difficulties 
for the executive (Mázi 2013 [interview]). Though, this does not justify deprivation of the 
Court’s original function as a check on the political branches.  
It is not an exaggeration to view the Hungarian Constitutional Court as a victim of 
constitution-making. The victory of Fidesz in the general elections in April 2010 came with a 
flurry of constitutional amendments, affecting the manner of the election, composition, 
jurisdiction and procedure of the Court, which escalated in the implementation of the Basic 
Law of 2012 and its subsequent amendments. The recent times of the new constitution are 
defined by the evaporation constraints on the government through repeated constitutional 
amendments. These constitutional amendments are regularly manufactured to override the 
decisions of the Court, and has brought with it serious consequences for its composition and 
jurisdiction that has reduced the role of the Court to a minimum (Uitz, 2013: 2-10).   
Changes in the constitutional regulation of the constitutional justices’ nomination process, as 
well as the increase in the number of judges from eleven to fifteen, changed the composition 
of the Court in favor of the governing majority, and gave Fidesz the opportunity to pack the 
Court with a majority of friendly faces (Polgari 2013 [interview]). In its first fifteen months in 
office, Fidesz named a total of seven new judges to the Court. This majority makes it unlikely 
that any important regulation or provision will be derailed by the Court’s actions. What is 
equally problematic is that there are judges within the Court who were previous members of 
either parliament or government, with clear ties to the governing majority, who then 
determines the constitutionality of laws that they might have voted on in parliament – or even 
submitted (Miklosi 2010 [interview]). As of 2013, judges who were appointed after 2010 no 
longer have to retire by the age of 70, but can instead remain in their seats until the end of 
their 12-year term. “The amendment ensures the presence of Fidesz loyalists in the Court for 
nearly a decade to come. That is convenient for Fidesz in the (unlikely) event of a change in 
power” (Polgár 2013 [interview]).  
The next step for Fidesz was to curb the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to budget and tax 
policy, unless these laws violated certain listed rights. By making it impossible for the Court 
to review budgets and tax laws, the government was able to act in the financial arena without 
having to pay attention to the usual constitutional constraints. The Basic Law further 
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abolished Actio Popularis, a competence that allowed anyone to bring an action to the Court, 
without limitations. A great majority of the Court’s proceedings during the two first decades 
fell in this category, and it caused a heavy workload for the Court. The removal of the 
competence can therefore, to a certain degree, be defended. A new jurisdiction was introduced 
as a replacement of Actio Popularis: the competence of constitutional complaint, which 
restricts citizens to only bring cases that involve infringements of their own rights to the Court 
(Kovács and Tóth, 2011: 185-190).  
The result of the changes is a Court that has lost its ability to guard the government. The 
Court has put down their gun, and surrendered. While the Constitutional Court used to be in a 
continuing dialogue with the other political branches, the Court has become a victim of 
constitution-making literally overnight. The political context of today’s Hungary has left the 
Constitutional Court defenseless and the government in a comfortable position, making 
incremental adjustment to the new “constitutional” order.  
5.3 What is the State of the Judiciary?  
The aim of this study was to trace the trajectory of judicial development, and contribute to a 
better understanding of the dynamics at play. In order to do so, the political context must be 
emphasized. The two-thirds majority of the governing majority, Fidesz, gives them the power 
to change everything. After the election in 2010, it was decided to use all the power to 
completely remake the constitutional order – and to further end the Hungarian transition 
begun in 1989 by completely replacing the constitution established at that time. The result 
was the Basic Law of 2012, which introduces a new governmental form in which Victor 
Orbán and Fidesz basically operates with a free hand.  
The development of the Hungarian judiciary meets the expectations that we draw on the basis 
of the theoretical expectations. The political balance of power in is presumed to be decisive 
for the degree of judicial independence. That is confirmed in the case of Hungary. When an 
alternation in power is unlikely, due to a dominant part, actions by the judiciary to act deliver 
judgments with political costs for the government are more likely to cause the government to 
take control of the judiciary, and thus limit their independence through changes in the formal 
framework. The changes can be limited by protective constituencies holding the government 
back, or if the courts themselves hold back. Though, if the composition of the judiciary alters, 
the likeliness of them holding the Court back consequently changes.  
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The finding of the study is that judicial development should be seen on the basis of the 
political context, which I have argued has caused a weakened judiciary, both in terms of 
judicial independence and authority. The Constitutional Court has suffered the most from the 
changes introduced by the ruling majority, and has rather rapidly been transformed from a 
guardian into a martyr when placed in the hands of the mighty parliamentary majority. The 
Court’s role in Hungary is now diminished to a minimum. The ordinary judiciary still has an 
undisputed place in the Hungarian society, but recent reforms, and subsequent amendments, 
have introduced a system in which judicial independence is questioned, and the 
concentrations of powers in the hand of one single official, independent of political 
background, contradicts the standards that are expected in a democratic regime. The aim to 
increase efficiency is a legitimate consideration, but the value of this objective falls 
dramatically when it happens at the expense of judicial independence.  With internal 
constitutional constraints melting away, the need for external checks and constraints on 
constitution-making is becoming critical. Among the protective constituencies who now 
function as the constrain that make it costly for the government to encroach on the courts’ 
independence, are the Venice Commission, which features prominently,  the European Court 
of Human Rights and various actors within EU, such as the Commission.  
The changes brought by the political context have changed the legal framework that provides 
judges with the ability to act independent. Limitations of the Court’s jurisdictions have 
weakened the political authority of the Court, and changes in the formal framework regarding 
appointment procedures and protection of tenure have consequently led to a Court less 
insulated from political interference from the executive. These procedural changes have 
caused a complete altering of the composition of the Court, which then works to alter the 
corporate culture. As judges with political ties to the governing majority acquires the balance 
of power within the Court, the ‘norms of appropriateness’ guiding judges in their work 
changes. Thus decreases their willingness to use the formal framework, and to act in an 
independent manner. That affects the amount of judgments that carry political costs for the 
government, and their inaction when action could be expected. The ordinary judiciary has 
gone through a similar development, in which the formal framework has been changed, and 
thus affected the ability and willingness to act in an independent manner.  It is a common 
focus on the corporate culture, which has changed as both institutions have been packed with 
judges who are expected to act in accordance with the government. Though, the ordinary 
judiciary is currently administered by a judicial, non-political organization, outwardly at least, 
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and is through appointment procedures, among other things, less politicized than the 
Constitutional Court. For now, at least. “The Constitutional Court has become too politicized, 
and that is the problem” (Polgari 2013 [interview]).  
“I am not so optimistic about the future of the Constitutional Court. In the long run, it might 
recover, but that depends on the next election”41 (Kovács 2013 [interview]). The problem is 
that Fidesz can continue to control policy far beyond the electoral mandate that is given to 
them, and thus constrain future governments with the decision they make now. These 
decisions can put constraints on power of future governments that disagree with the current 
one. The constitutional system of today makes the future of the Hungarian judiciary look 
pessimistic. “It is a slippery slope to have such an easy amendment rule” (Kovács 2013 
[interview]).  
“No wonder Europe is worried about judicial independence in Hungary” 
(Scheppele, 2012) 
5.4 Concluding Remarks: limitations of the data material and suggestions for further 
research 
In this thesis I have used data from several sources to construct a study of the Hungarian 
judiciary. Through interviewing political, bureaucratic, academic and organizational persons, 
I have been able to gather information about the case under scrutiny. I have corroborated the 
data collected from interviews with documentary data to secure an in-depth analysis of the 
judicial development in Hungary. However, the argument can always be made that one should 
have collected more data through additional interviews with other people, or consulted other 
data sources. The problem for me was to get interviews with representatives from political 
parties, and in particular, representatives from the governing majority, Fidesz. I had to search 
for their arguments through proxies such as political commentators and political blogs. This is 
not an ideal solution, as it makes it harder for me to assess the reliability of the data. Though, 
when triangulating different sources of data, the conclusion is still based on a wider set of 
evidences, and when interviews gave the same story as the secondary source, I felt that the 
reliability was strengthened. Another limitation of this study is the highly specific character of 
the data. When conducting data through interviews, I ensure that the findings are valuable for 
my particular case. Though, their relevance beyond the context of Hungary is more uncertain. 
                                                          
41
 The next election has already been held: on April 6, Fidesz and KDNP gained once again a two-thirds majority.  
93 
 
As mentioned above, the findings of this thesis shows that judicial independence in Hungary 
should be seen on the basis of the political context, which function as an underlying variable, 
affecting courts’ ability and willingness to act in an independent manner. If I was to continue 
the research of this thesis, the consequences of the newly held parliamentary election, as of 
April 2014, in which Fidesz once again won the two-thirds majority, would constitute a very 
interesting focus for further research. Especially in the context of increasing international 
attention directed towards Hungary by the EU and other external checks. Furthermore, 
Hungary’s ongoing alternative constitutional reality is an intriguing case that should be an 
interesting case to observe and study more closely.  
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Appendix 1: List of Respondents 
Respondent 
number: 
Name: Position: Organization: Date: 
1 Dr. Lóránt 
Csink 
Senior Advisor Office for the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights 
(the Ombudsman’s Office) 
13.11.13 
 
 
2 Nenad 
Dimitrijevic 
Professor CEU, Political Science 
Department 
13.11.13 
 
 
3 Dr. Eszter 
Polgari 
Special Project 
Officer 
CEU, Legal Studies Department 13.11.13 
 
 
4 Tamás 
Polgár 
Assistant 
Professor 
 
Corvinus University of Budapest, 
Institute of Political Science 
 
14.11.13 
 
 
5 Gergely Deli Assistent/ 
Sekretær 
The Constitutional Court 14.11.13 
 
 
6 Johanna 
Fröhlich 
AND 
Balázs D. 
Toth 
Clerks/ 
Legal Assistants 
The Constitutional Court 14.11.13 
 
 
7 Zoltan 
Miklosi 
Professor CEU, Department of Legal 
Studies 
14.11.13 
 
 
8 Zoltán Fleck Professor ELTE, Sociology of Law 15.11.13 
 
 
9 András Mázi Senior Research 
Fellow 
Századvég Foundation 15.11.13 
 
 
10 Dr. György 
Senyei 
Member of the 
Court of Appeal 
(judge) 
The Court of Appeal 18.11.13 
 
 
11 András 
Jakab 
Professor/ 
Academic 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Centre for Social Sciences, 
Institute for Legal Studies 
18.11.13 
 
 
12 Dr. Edit 
JuhásZ AND   
Dr. Mária 
Vitvindics 
Juhász: Head of 
the Private Law 
and Justice 
Codification 
Divison/ 
Department 
Vitvindics: 
assigned judge 
The Ministry of Justice 19.11.13 
 
 
13 Dr. Kriszta 
Kovács 
Post-doctor 
Fellow, Senior 
Advisor at the 
CC 
ELTE, Faculty of Social Sciences 
AND 
The Constitutional Court  
(on a leave) 
19.11.13 
 
 
14 Elisabeth 
Katalin 
Grabow 
Journalist: Co-
editor and News 
Editor 
Co-editor in chief at the 
BUDAPEST ZEITUNG  
News editor of the BUDAPEST 
TIMES 
20.11.13 
 
 
15 Krisztián 
Gáva 
Deputy State 
Secretary for the 
Legislation of 
Public Law 
The Ministry of Justice 20.11.13 
 
 
16 Dr. Aron Head of the National Office for the Judiciary 22.11.13 
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László Tóth Cabinet of the 
President 
 
 
17 Miklós 
Szántho 
Head Analyst Centre for Fundamental Rights 
(legal research institute) – 
sympathize with the government 
22.11.13 
 
 
18 George 
Károlyi 
Founder of the 
Joseph Károlyi 
Foundation 
The Joseph Károlyi Foundation (a 
non-profit organization aiming at 
promoting Hungary’s integration 
to Europe) 
23.11.13 
19 Tibor Sepsi Attorney-at-law, 
Constitutional 
lawyer (law 
expert 
Working for LMP – ”Politics can 
be different” 
23.11.13 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide  
INTRODUCTION 
KEY 
COMPONENTS: 
 Thank you 
 My name 
 Purpose of the 
interview/the 
study 
 Confidentiality 
 Does the 
respondent 
allow personal 
information to 
be published? 
 Anonymous, if 
desired 
 How 
interviews will 
be conducted 
 Opportunity for 
questions 
 Signature of 
consent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERSONAL NOTES: 
I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. 
 
My name is Sunniva Christophersen Haugen, and I am a master student 
in Comparative Politics, from the University of Bergen, in Norway. I 
would like to talk to you about the courts in Hungary, and the state of 
the judiciary in terms of independence and authority – with a special 
focus on the institutions’ development since the breakdown of 
communism in 1989.  
 
(My master thesis is an exploratory case study of Hungary, in which I 
focus on two different processes that have taken place over a 30-year 
period: the judicial institution, and the Constitutional Court in 
particular, was characterized as both strong and active early in the 
democratization process, but has in recent years, according to some 
literature, apparently lost power and the mandate to act independently. 
Hungary has, at the same time, experienced reforms that have affected 
constitutional, as well as political, matters – and this has caused some 
critics to question the validity of the nation’s democracy.) 
 
The aim of my master thesis is to identify how and why the Hungarian 
judiciary – and their political role - has changed over 30-year period, 
and how judicial development can be seen in the context of democratic 
development, regime changes, reforms and constitutional changes.  
 
The purpose of this interview is to hear about your thoughts about these 
developments, and how this it related to other developments within the 
regime. The interview should take about 30-60 minutes, and, as I am 
hoping that this could be more of a conversation than a questioning, I 
only have a few main questions. I will be recording the interview 
because I don’t want to miss any of your comments, and I hope that is 
ok? I will also be taking some notes.  
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS: 
 No more than 
10 questions 
 Add: please 
elaborate, 
please explain, 
can you 
elaborate on 
that?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hope that it is ok if I use personal information – your name and 
occupation - in the final thesis? You will not be quoted by name unless 
you have been given the opportunity to approve the quotes. All other 
personal information will be kept confidential, and is only available for 
my supervisor and me. Are there any questions about what I have just 
explained?  
 
Would you be willing to sign this consent form?  
 
1. Personal information  will not be recorded.  
 Name 
 Occupation 
2. How would you describe the Hungarian judiciary and the role of 
the courts in Hungary?  
 What are their specific tasks, and how are the legal system 
organized? (Question for academics and people within the 
legal institution) 
 How would you describe the role of Constitutional Court? 
 How’s the relationship between the Constitutional Court and 
the rest of the judiciary? Is the degree of independence and 
authority lower or higher in the Constitutional Court than in 
other parts of the judiciary? 
3. In your view, how has the role of the courts changed since the 
breakdown of communism?  
 How has the judiciary developed?  
 If things have changed, why has this happened?  
 Is this change for the better or for the worse? 
 How about the Constitutional Court, has its role changed over 
time? 
4. Do you think the court is independent in Hungary today?  
 Has this changed throughout the years?  
 Why and how has this changed?  
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 What about the independence of the Constitutional Court – has 
this changed?  
 What do you think has caused these changes – are there any 
specific events that have been important?  
5. (How is the relationship with other branches of government 
organized, and how does the interaction with these branches 
work?  
 Is it a power-sharing relationship between the branches, with 
clearly defined areas of focus?) 
6. Did the introduction of constitutional amendments and the new 
Fundamental Law of 2012 affect the role of the courts? How?  
 What exactly are the consequences of the new Fundamental 
Law, if any, for the legal institution in Hungary? 
 Has this lead to changes in the functioning and authority of the 
legal institution?  
 Did these changes advance or hinder legal independence and 
authority in any way? (Question for academics and journalists) 
 In your view, have constitutional changes, in some ways, 
limited the Constitutional Court? 
7. What do you think of your own relationship to political 
authorities? Has this role changed? (Interviewing judges).  
8. Some literature suggests that the Constitutional Court is weaker 
than it used to be, as a consequence of constitutional 
amendments and the new constitution of 2012. Do you find this 
to be the case? 
 If that is the case, how does that affect the accountability 
mechanisms of the legal institution as a whole?  
9. There are different views on what the proper role should be 
between the judiciary and political bodies. Some think that 
judges should stay out of political issues, while others think that 
it is important that courts are active to protect democratic 
principles and secure citizens’ rights, not least the rights of 
minorities and social and economic rights. What is your view on 
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CLOSING KEY 
COMPONENTS: 
 Additional 
comments 
 Next step 
 Thank you 
 
what belongs to the political domain and what should be the 
matter of judges? 
 In your view, is it important to keep the political and the 
judicial domain separated?    
 Should judges interfere in politics, or should they act as 
political neutral actors? Is that even possible? 
 
My check list:  
 What is the role of courts? 
 How has this changed?  
 
Is there anything more you would like to add? 
 
I’ll be analyzing the information you and the other respondents gave 
me, and I’ll submit the final thesis on June 1, 2014. I’ll be happy to 
send you a copy to review at that time, if you are interested. Also, 
would you like to approve your quotes before I use them in the final 
thesis?  
 
Thank you for your time. 
